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THE WHITE SUPREMACIST CONSTITUTION
Ruth Colker*
Abstract
The United States Constitution is a document that, during every era,
has helped further white supremacy. White supremacy constitutes a
“political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly
control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas
of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white
dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a
broad array of institutions and social settings.”1 Rather than understand
the Constitution as a force for progressive structural change, we should
understand it as a barrier to change.
From its inception, the Constitution enshrined slavery and the
degradation of Black people by considering them to be property rather
than equal members of the community. The Civil War Amendments did not
truly abolish slavery and only prohibited a limited band of state action.
Radical Reconstruction was short-lived as white supremacy quickly
eviscerated any political gains that Black voters had achieved.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Civil War Amendments
consistently with their white supremacist roots. Rather than serve as an
effective instrument to help eradicate the badges, incidents, and vestiges
of slavery, the Constitution has become a tool both to ban voluntary raceaffirmative measures at the federal, state, and local government level, and
also to preclude Congress from enacting strong abolitionist measures. The
Court has enshrined the views of Andrew Johnson, a fierce proponent of
white supremacy, into its basic structure.
This Article challenges us to imagine how resistance lawyers might
seek to use the Constitution to help eliminate white supremacy while also
generally recognizing the limitations of the use of the judicial system,
including the specific limitations of the U.S. Constitution, for that purpose.
Only then might we achieve a truly radical reconstruction.

© 2022 Ruth Colker. Distinguished University Professor & Heck-Faust Memorial
Chair in Constitutional Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. I would like
to thank Moritz law librarian Stephanie Ziegler for her assistance with this Article. I would
also like to thank my colleagues at the Moritz College of Law who attended workshops on
December 8, 2020 and April 7, 2021 and offered valuable feedback. I would especially like
to thank Amna Akbar, Cinnamon Carlarne, Sean Hill, and David Levine for their
constructive suggestions on an earlier draft.
1 Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989).
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution is a document that, during every era, has helped
further white supremacy. Rather than understand the document as a force for
progressive structural change, we should understand it as a barrier to change. Put
differently, the U.S. Constitution has been a resounding success at preserving white
supremacy. For example, U.S. citizens in the District of Columbia, who are
disproportionately racial minorities, are provided no power in the U.S. Senate,2
while the former slave-holding states of Alabama and Mississippi have as much
Senatorial power as California and New York.3 Further, the Constitution makes it
especially difficult to divide existing states into more than one state so that more
populous and diverse states, such as California and New York, could have greater
power in the Senate to influence judicial nominations.4 These are only some of the
many deliberate design features that structure our so-called democracy in which
Black lives are intended not to matter.5
One might respond that certain substantive features of the U.S. Constitution,
found in the Bill of Rights6 and the Civil War Amendments,7 could yet make the
Cf. Ian Millhiser, How an Anti-democratic Constitution Gave America Amy Coney
Barrett,
VOX
(Oct.
26,
2020,
8:09
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/10/26/21534358/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett-constitution
-anti-democratic-electoral-college-senate [https://perma.cc/G7DX-ZXMY] (stating that the
Republican Senators who voted to confirm Amy Coney Barrett represented 13.5 million
fewer Americans than the Democratic Senators who opposed her).
3 Cf. Geoffrey Skelley, Can Democrats Win the Senate by Adding States? It’s Been
Done
Before,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(June
5,
2019,
7:00
AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/can-democrats-win-the-senate-by-adding-states-its-been
-done-before/ [https://perma.cc/4474-X5R3]; see also Eric W. Orts, The Path to Give
California 12 Senators, and Vermont Just One, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2019)
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/heres-how-fix-senate/579172/ [https://
perma.cc/KV72-UE9R] (explaining how California, New York, and other states could
receive more Senate seats which would likely increase the voting representation of racial
minorities in the United States Senate).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two more States,
or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as
of the Congress.”).
5 See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (providing a wide ranging discussion of how the Supreme
Court fails to reflect democratic principles).
6
See The Bill of Rights: What Does It Say?, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights/what-does-it-say [https://perma.cc/
GW62-RS24] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (explaining that the Bill of Rights includes the first
ten amendments to the Constitution).
7 See Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S.
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmend
2
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Constitution a tool to help overcome white supremacy. While, in theory, that
argument may be plausible, this Article will demonstrate the stark failure of the
Constitution to live up to that possibility.
Nonetheless, as resistance lawyers,8 this Article challenges us to find the
fragmentary strands of abolitionism within certain minority or dissenting judicial
opinions that can be used to help make the Constitution a tool for abolitionism. In
particular, this Article asks whether we can re-imagine the Civil War Amendments
so that they are a force for abolitionism, rather than a barrier to it.
What are the features of white supremacy? In a 1989 article, Frances Lee
Ansley described “white supremacy” as a “political, economic and cultural system
in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious
and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and
relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across
a broad array of institutions and social settings.”9 Ansley observed that there is both
a class and a race model for understanding white supremacy. “The ‘class model’ of
white supremacy portrays white supremacy as primarily a means to justify and
enhance class dominance and thus to strengthen existing relations of economic
power.”10 The “race model” of white supremacy “characterizes white supremacy as
an evil standing on its own base. . . . [T]here is no reason to look beyond the system
ments.htm [https://perma.cc/8JXP-4PS8] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (explaining that the
Civil War Amendments include the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and
were ratified by the states on December 6, 1865; July 9, 1868; and February 3, 1870
respectively). The Civil War Amendments are not the only provisions of the U.S.
Constitution that could, in theory, be an instrument for progressive change. A similar article
could be written about the potential in theory and the failure in actuality of many of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, Denying Systemic Equality: The
Last Words of the Kennedy Court, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 539 (2019) (examining how
the Supreme Court’s voting, speech, and religion decisions in the 2017–18 term denied
systemic equality).
8 See generally Daniel Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1881
(2019) (“A resistance lawyer engages in a regular, direct service practice within a procedural
and substantive legal regime that she considers unjust and illegitimate.”).
9 Ansley, supra note 1, at 1024 n.129 (1989). Ta-Nehisi Coates notes that:
To Trump, whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic but is the very core of his
power. . . . The repercussions are striking: Trump is the first president to have
served in no public capacity before ascending to his perch. But more telling,
Trump is also the first president to have publicly affirmed that his daughter is a
‘piece of ass.’ . . . [T]hat is the point of white supremacy—to ensure that that
which all others achieve with maximal effort, white people (particularly white
men) achieve with minimal qualification.
Ta-Nehisi Coates, The First White President: The Foundation of Donald Trump’s
Presidency Is the Negation of Barack Obama’s Legacy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-white-president-ta-nehisicoates/537909/ [https://perma.cc/NXF3-PC4W].
10 Ansley, supra note 1, at 1025.
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of racial hierarchy itself to understand its well-springs and strength.”11 But Ansley
also notes that pure models of white supremacy do not exist in the real world. “The
themes of race and class refuse to keep their bounds. They constantly interpenetrate,
converge, and reflect on each other.”12 The system is maintained through politics,
economics, and culture. I would add the Constitution to her list of systems that help
maintain White Supremacy.
Ansley’s work continues to be important today as we wrestle with calls for an
abolitionist society in which we “transform our built environment and our
relationships with one another and the earth.”13 Today’s abolitionist activists
“embody a combined concern with democracy and the economy, the ends and
processes of grassroots power: to fight criminalization and privatization as we
organize for collective self-determination.”14 In other words, today’s abolitionists
have accepted Ansley’s call to consider both seeds of capitalism and racism to create
a more just and democratic society.
In a breathtaking article published in 2020, Michael Klarman describes how
U.S. democracy is at risk because the privileged few control our so-called
democratic instruments.
To entrench democracy, Democrats would need to overcome
simultaneously the disadvantages of partisan gerrymandering and
geographic clustering in state legislatures and the House of
Representatives, extreme malapportionment in the Senate, the vagaries
and malapportionment of the Electoral College, and the flood of
unregulated political spending that the Court has unleashed.15
In an afterthought, though, he quickly notes: “Even then, Republican Justices might
invalidate democracy-entrenching measures.”16
While recognizing that “[w]e are trapped in a downward spiral in which
growing economic inequality erodes democracy, leading to the enactment of more
policies that further exacerbate economic inequality, which then further erodes
democracy,”17 he argues that “democratic reform logically must come first.”18 But,
as Amna Akbar aptly notes: “Electoral reform is unlikely to mobilize a public where
only twenty to sixty-five percent of eligible voters cast their ballots in various
elections and only twenty percent trust the federal government.”19 And Akbar does
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1050.
13 Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic Political Economy, 134 HARV. L. REV.
F. 90, 90 (2020).
14 Id. at 98.
15 Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and the
Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (2020).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 254.
18 Id.
19 Akbar, supra note 13, at 96.
11
12
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not ask the more frightening question of whether a democratic electorate, if the
franchise were exercised universally, would seek to end white supremacy. Would
we still need a constitution to protect Black people and others who have been
subordinated since our Nation’s founding? Other countries have used their
constitutions expressly to protect those, such as Native people, who have had their
lands stolen from them to build and maintain a privileged ruling class.20
Putting aside the question of what kinds of reforms must come first to overturn
white supremacy, one might wonder how it could be true that the U.S. Constitution
could be used as a tool to invalidate democracy-entrenching measures. The answer
to that question is complex (and Klarman devotes 264 pages to discussing many of
those impediments),21 but this Article proposes an explanation that Klarman barely
explores. The U.S. has never been willing to allow democracy to flourish because
democracy might be a tool to challenge some aspects of white supremacy. To be
clear, the creation of genuine democracy will not suddenly end white supremacy.
White supremacy preceded the creation of the Constitution and would certainly
endure its demise.22 It is nonetheless important to recognize that the U.S.
Constitution is an impediment to the kinds of structural reforms that are needed to
lessen the strength of white supremacy.
Dorothy Roberts, while a brilliant scholar, was wrong to suggest that the seeds
of what she calls “abolition constitutionalism”23 can be found in the U.S.
Constitution. The lesson to be learned from the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”)
movement is that change can only occur through political, social action, not through
the courts and, especially, not through the Constitution. Monuments that glorify
white supremacy, both literally and figuratively, did not come down as a result of
legal action. They came down through protests on the streets.24 The courts will stand

20 See,

e.g., CANADA ACT, 1982, C 11 § 35(1) (“The existing aboriginal and treaty rights
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”); see also id. at §
15(2) (validating explicitly that affirmative action by providing that the Equal Protection
Clause “does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration
of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.”).
21 See Klarman, supra note 15.
22 See Ibram X. Kendi, Racial Progress Is Real. But So Is Racist Progress, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/racial-progress-isreal-but-so-is-racist-progress.html [https://perma.cc/6F3M-ZAK8] (commenting on the
transition from Obama to Trump as President of the United States as reflecting a “dual and
dueling history of racial progress and the simultaneous progression of racism”).
23 Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 3
(2019).
24 See Christine Emba, A Monumental Shift: Memorials to White Supremacy Are
Falling. What Will Replace Them?, WASH. POST (June 17, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/graphics/2020/opinions/confederate-statues-monuments/ [https://perma.cc/JW2V8CP] (highlighting the different statues that have been removed as a result of mass protests).
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in the way rather than facilitate the attainment of many of BLM’s list of demands.
This Article will recount how the U.S. Constitution has been a barrier to, rather than
instrument for, justice.
Part I recounts the historical debate about the role of the Constitution in
structural reform among anti-slavery advocates. By the late 1830s, William Lloyd
Garrison had taken the position that the Constitution was so profoundly pro-slavery
that the only solution was for the free states to secede from the Union.25 While
Frederick Douglass initially agreed with Garrison that the Constitution was
inextricably pro-slavery, Douglass eventually abandoned that position and argued
that the Constitution could be used as a vehicle for reform.26 We are in a moment
where the Garrison/Douglass debate should be rekindled. Despite the ratification of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, is the Constitution still a
profoundly pro-slavery document? Or can it be used as an abolitionist tool?
Part II recounts how the Constitution was written and interpreted to preserve
both slavery and white supremacy. Even the Thirteenth Amendment did not
completely abolish slavery.27 The state action doctrine immediately eviscerated the
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment by precluding individuals from seeking legal
redress against private actors.28 Qualified immunity protects state actors, like police
officers, from responsibility.29 The public murder of Black people has occurred
throughout our nation’s history,30 with capital punishment being the latest statesanctioned tool to that end.31 Black people remained incarcerated even as COVID-

IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF
RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 164 (2016).
26 Roberts, supra, note 23, at 59.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (ratified in December 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery or involuntary servitude “except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted”).
28 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment could not be used to justify Congress regulating private actors).
29 The doctrine of qualified immunity was first developed in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 557 (1967) (providing qualified immunity to police officers who arrested and jailed a
group of Black people who attempted to eat at a coffee shop in a bus terminal in violation of
Mississippi law); see also Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified
Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2016) (offering an excellent critique of the expansion of
qualified immunity doctrine to protect public officials from any accountability).
30 See, e.g., KENDI, supra, note 25, at 259 (“Someone was lynched, on average, every
four days from 1889 to 1929. . . . White men, women, and children gathered to watch the
torture, killing, and dismemberment of human beings – all the while calling the victims
savages.”).
31 John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. Has Fallen by a Third Since
2006, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 6, 2006), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/
share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-2018-vs-2006/ [https://perma.cc/Z8TEZ9Q3] (“In 2018, black Americans represented 33% of the sentenced prison population,
nearly triple their 12% share of the U.S. adult population.”).
25
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19 ravaged the prison system.32 When Black activists sought to end racially inferior
schools, the courts balked at creating effective remedies.33 In a completely
ahistorical interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
soon became a tool to overturn affirmative action out of fear of hurting “innocent
whites”34 whose century of wealth had been built on the back of Black labor.35 While
one might hope that the electoral system could fill in the gaps created by the
Constitution through the election of leaders who seek to use their power to overcome
the legacy of slavery, the reality is that the Constitution has impeded that possibility.
The Constitution, itself, rewards southern states with disproportionate political
power to perpetuate white supremacy.36 When Congress finds the political will to
create some statutory protections for Black people, the Supreme Court finds ways to
significantly limit those statutes.37 One must ask: what has the Constitution ever
done for Black people? It has precluded all hope of structural reform and allowed
See Jordan Wilkie, Prisons Contribute to Racial Imbalance in COVID-19 Impact in
NC, CAROLINA PUB. PRESS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://carolinapublicpress.org/42342/prisonscontribute-to-racial-imbalance-in-covid-19-impact-in-nc/ [https://perma.cc/VG8K-K2TR]
(explaining how previous criminal justice reform, which has disproportionately affected the
black population, has extended prison sentences and thus put black workers and prisoners at
greater harm from COVID-19); Len Engel, Joanna Abaroa-Ellison, Erin Jemison & Khalil
Cumberbatch, Racial Disparities and COVID-19, NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Nov. 2020), https://cdn.ymaws.com/counciloncj.org/resource/resmgr/
covid_commission/Racial_Disparities_and_COVID.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KBA-W74C]
(explaining that people of color in the United States, especially poor people of color, are
disproportionately affected by crime, the criminal justice system, and COVID-19); Eddie
Burkhalter, Izzy Colón, Brendon Derr, Lazaro Gamio, Rebecca Griesbach, Ann Hinga Klein,
Danya Issawi, K.B. Mensah, Derek M. Norman & Savannah Redl et. al., Incarcerated and
Infected: How the Virus Tore Through U.S. Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/10/us/covid-prison-outbreak.html?action=
click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/S7BJ-9DNY] (“America’s
prisons, jails and detention centers have been among the nation’s most dangerous places
when it comes to infections from the coronavirus.”).
33 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974) (overturning mandatory
busing order).
34 See, e.g., Dotson v. City of Indianola, Miss., 739 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1981)
(“In fashioning a remedial plan, the balancing process may include consideration of not only
the interests of the minority, but also the interests of innocent whites.”); Hammon v. Barry,
606 F. Supp. 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he fact of past discrimination alone is not enough
to deprive innocent whites of their legitimate expectation of advancement.”).
35 See, e.g., Michael A. Lawrence, Racial Justice Demands Truth & Reconciliation, 80
U. PITT. L. REV. 69, 84 (2018) (“Perhaps not surprisingly, the Southern states did not go
quietly into the night—rather, nearly all of them quickly began passing laws (‘black codes’)
designed, ultimately, to ensure the availability of African-Americans as a cheap labor force
. . . [The black codes’] ‘primary purpose was to restrict blacks’ labor and activity.’”) (quoting
Black Codes, HISTORY, http://www.history.com.topics/black-history/black-codes).
36 See Skelley, supra note 3.
37 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (overturning
minority owned business program of the Small Business Administration).
32
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Black people to gather the scraps of the remedies still available under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.38 Part II argues that we should understand the Constitution to be
an impediment to racial equality rather than a tool to dismantle white supremacy.
Even Brown v. Board of Education has come to further white supremacy.39
Part III asks how we should teach the basic course on Constitutional law given
the Constitution’s role in promoting and preserving white supremacy. This Article
argues that we should teach Constitutional law from a critical lens that does not
venerate the document. We should use the course to help our students understand
how the Constitution is rarely an affirmative tool to dismantle white supremacy;
instead, it is often an impediment to the radical reform that seeks to end the legacy
of slavery.
Although this Article focuses on the white supremacist ideology that permeates
the Constitution, the same claim could be made on behalf of every other
disadvantaged group in the United States. The document is also sexist,40 ableist,41
xenophobic,42 colonialist,43 and homophobic.44 It is time to stop venerating the
Constitution. It is usually just another barrier to change.
But this Article does not end on a nihilistic note. While the dominant story of
Constitutional law has been the support for, rather than dismantling of, white
supremacy, there have been noted jurists over the centuries who have found seeds
of abolitionism within the Constitution. Because Justice Thurgood Marshall offers
the most powerful abolitionist voice among jurists, this Article seeks to elevate
Marshall’s voice to be the controlling understanding of the Constitution. Only then
can the U.S. Constitution be one tool, among many, to attain a radical reconstruction.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation, public facilities, public education, federally assisted programs, and
employment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (public accommodations), 2000b–2000b-3
(public education), 2000c–2000c-9 (federally assisted programs) & 20000e–2000e-17
(employment).
39 See infra Section II.C.
40 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948 (2002) (arguing that
reconsideration of the Nineteenth Amendment’s historical purpose could strengthen gender
equality claims).
41 See generally Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J.
527 (2014) (arguing for heightened constitutional review in disability cases).
42 See Karla McKanders, Deconstructing Invisible Walls: Sotomayor’s Dissents in an
Era of Immigration Exceptionalism, 27 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 95, 99
(2020) (describing the Supreme Court’s history of deference to the executive branch in the
context of xenophobia).
43 See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2019) (arguing the importance of not using a racial binary
paradigm to understand U.S. public law).
44 See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Closet Case”: Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 81 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has silenced gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals).
38
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I. THE CONSTITUTION’S WHITE SUPREMACIST UNDERPINNINGS
This Part discusses the strong current of white supremacy that has dominated
American politics in every era. Part II shows how the courts have faithfully
interpreted the Constitution to achieve this end.
The British kidnapped the first group of African people in 1619 and “dragged
[them] to this county in chains to be sold into slavery.”45 By the time of the American
Revolution, the British had forcibly transported around three million African people
to the American colonies to work as enslaved people.46 Slavery formed the core of
the Southern colonies’ agricultural economy.47 “[T]he slave was deprived of all legal
rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could be sold away from his family
and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming him was not a crime.”48
As thoroughly documented by Manisha Sinha, enslaved people always sought
the abolition of slavery in the United States.49 During the revolutionary era, they
“accepted abolitionism in word and deed as an article of faith.”50 They petitioned
the government for the immediate abolition of slavery; they sought both
compensation and redress.51 In comparison to the complaints of the white colonists
against Great Britain, enslaved people thought their own sufferings were far more
profound.52 Despite this resistance, slavery was deeply entrenched in the American
colonies.53 “Forgotten antislavery voices and actions of Quaker and African
pioneers, slave rebels and runaways, radical, dissenting Christianity, English
antislavery lawyers and judges, and early black writers all played a part in laying the
foundation of revolutionary abolitionism.”54 Abolition’s origins in the United States
were interracial, even if not embraced by the propertied white men who wrote the
Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson’s original draft of the Declaration of Independence contained
some anti-slavery language, but it was “removed at the behest of lower south
slaveholders from South Carolina and Georgia.”55 Like Thomas Jefferson, both John
45 Regents

Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also Congress Abolishes the African Slave Trade, HISTORY (Feb. 9, 2010),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/congress-abolishes-the-african-slave-trade
[https://perma.cc/3D2L-AMNV] (“The first shipload of African captives to the British
colonies in North America arrived . . . in August 1619.”).
46 Congress Abolishes the African Slave Trade, supra note 45.
47 Id.
48 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 388.
49 See generally MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION
(2016).
50 Id. at 41.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 43 (“The petitioners condemned racism that prevented colonists from including
Africans in conceptions of American liberty.”).
53 Id. at 44.
54 Id. at 33.
55 Id. at 40.
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Jay and Benjamin Franklin were slaveholders.56 “Antislavery sentiment among the
founding fathers may have been widespread, but committed abolitionists were few
and far between.”57 Despite his long-term sexual relationship58 with Sally Hemings,
with whom he fathered six Black children, Jefferson believed that Black people were
“inferior in the faculties of reason and imagination” and that racial “mixing” should
not take place after slaves were freed.59 Jefferson’s racist views were used by
influential Virginia residents, like St. George Tucker, to justify the inappropriateness
of allowing free Black people to join Virginia’s privileged society.60
The language of the U.S. Constitution, as it was adopted in 1787, makes it clear
that the slaveholders controlled the narrative. The fact that the document did not use
the words “slave” or “slavery” should not be misunderstood as any kind of
vindication for abolitionists. Article One, Section Nine provided that the “migration
or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper
to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight.”61 Such “persons,” of course, were African slaves. Their
continued, forcible kidnapping from Africa to be held as slaves was permitted to
continue until 1808. The Three-Fifths Clause62 refused to recognize slaves as
persons entitled to hold citizenship and vote and also allowed the Southern colonies
to dominate the national government. As David Waldstreicher has argued, we should
consider the Constitution to be “Slavery’s Constitution.”63
In 1808, the United States Congress abolished the importation of slaves, a year
after Britain had outlawed the British Atlantic slave trade.64 Thereafter, enslaved
people already held in the United States, and their offspring, were rarely made free.65

56 Id.

at 40–41.
Id. at 41.
58 By using the word “relationship,” I do not mean to suggest that it was a consensual
relationship.
59 SINHA, supra note 49, at 88.
60 Id. at 90–91.
61 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 1.
62 The U.S. Constitution, Article 1. Section 2. The “Three-Fifths Clause,” THIRTEEN,
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/slavery/experience/legal/docs2.html [https://perma.cc/GP5K
-99Q5] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (“[A]ny person who was not free would be counted as
three-fifths of a free individual for the purposes of determining congressional
representation.”); see, e.g., U.S. CONST., art 1, § 2.
63 See generally DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM
REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009).
64 See Reuters Staff, Chronology – Who Banned Slavery When?, REUTERS (Mar. 22,
2007, 12:18 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-slavery/chronology-who-bannedslavery-when-idUSL1561464920070322 [https://perma.cc/WFH5-E7FN].
65 See Congress Abolishes the African Slave Trade, supra note 45 (explaining that
during the late 1700s and early 1800s, in the southern states “children of enslaved people
automatically became enslaved themselves”).
57
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White owners of enslaved people still traded enslaved people and their children.
With a population of four million enslaved people, slavery could thrive without the
assistance of an African trade to bring newly enslaved people to the United States.66
Seeds of anti-slavery sentiment always existed, and they gained more weight in
the nineteenth century. In fact, the emerging anti-slavery view in the early eighteenth
century, especially among white politicians and activists, was arguably consistent
with white supremacy because it did not seek to free or empower Black people. In
the 1820s, the predominant anti-slavery position was that of colonization—freed
Black people would be forcefully relocated back to Africa.67 Thomas Jefferson, who
was well known as the chief architect of the Declaration of Independence, favored
the colonization position. While a draft of the Declaration of Independence had
included the charge that the King has waged a “cruel war against human nature itself,
violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people
who never offended him, captivating and carrying them in slavery in another
hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither,” that language
was not included in the final document.68 In his Autobiography, Jefferson took the
position that “the two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government.”69
K-Sue Park, in a brilliant piece on U.S. historical self-deportation policy, argues
that anti-slavery proponents in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
could not imagine integrating Black people into U.S. life as a consequence of ending
slavery.70 “White northerners wished to ensure that blacks would stay in the South,
and white southerners would not contemplate civic equality. These factors, together
with the daunting expense and logistics of a mass expulsion, long stymied efforts
during the early Republic to imagine a concrete end to slavery.”71 The mass
deportation of free Black people was a central point of deliberation along a broad
political spectrum. “Indeed, Frederick Douglass remarked that ‘almost every
respectable man’ in the north was in favor of black colonization. By the 1840s . . .
eleven northern state legislatures had formally endorsed black colonization.”72
While Sinha’s work73 suggests that most free Black people opposed
colonization, John Russwurm, one of the two Black editors of Freedom’s Journal,

66 Id. (explaining how the southern congressmen joined northern congressmen to ban
the slave trade in 1808 since the south already had “a self-sustaining population” of enslaved
people).
67 KENDI, supra note 25, at 152–53 (“[Thomas Jefferson] promoted the colonization
idea, that freed Blacks be hauled away to Africa in the same manner that enslaved Blacks
had been hauled to America.”).
68 Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256, at 388 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 392.
70 K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1904 (2019).
71 Id. at 1904–05.
72 Id. at 1905–06.
73 See SINHA, supra note 49.
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favored colonization.74 Further, Russwurm’s publication often expressed the view
“that lower-income Blacks had an inferior work ethic, inferior intelligence, and
inferior morality compared to White people and Black elites like him.”75
Some anti-slavery advocates, however, began to oppose colonization. William
Lloyd Garrison, a white man raised in New England in poverty, initially championed
colonization,76 but, by 1828, he began to support “a gradual abolition of slavery”
rather than colonization.77 He first thought that immediate emancipation was a “wild
vision” but then moved to the position of supporting immediate emancipation.78
Antislavery activist David Walker, who was a member of Boston’s Black
community, agreed with Garrison that immediate emancipation was necessary. In
fact, in his pamphlets, Walker urged Black people to mobilize for a revolutionary
war.79 Nonetheless, like Russwurm, Walker thought that slavery had made Black
people inferior.80 They were “the most degraded, wretched, and abject set of beings
that ever lived since the world began.”81 Walker also drew on the Declaration of
Independence, “imploring Americans to ‘See your Declaration!’”82 as part of his call
for Black people to attain their freedom. Many Southern states tried to suppress his
pamphlet because of its subversive appeal.83
Although Nat Turner’s 1832 rebellion famously used force to free Black people
from slavery, abolitionists, such as Garrison, criticized those efforts arguing that the
“fury against revolters” would cause the public to forget the horrors of slavery.84 The
dominant message from anti-slavery activists was the importance of uplift suasion.85
The newly formed American Anti-Slavery Society, for example, instructed their
agents in 1833 to instill in free Black people “the importance of domestic order, and
the performance of relative duties in families; of correct habits; command of temper
and courteous manners.”86
In a well-known and important historical disagreement, William Lloyd
Garrison and Frederick Douglass debated whether the United States Constitution
could be understood to be a proslavery document. Garrison called the Constitution’s
failure to abolish slavery a “covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”87 Both
KENDI, supra, note 25, at 155 (“Russwurm decided to endorse the American
Colonization Society in 1829, dooming his newspaper in anti-colonizationalist Black
America.”).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 162.
77 Id. at 164.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 165.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 166.
83 Id. at 167.
84 Id. at 173.
85 Id. at 505 (“Historically, Black people have by and large figured the smartest thing
we could do for ourselves is to partake in uplift suasion. . . .”).
86 Id. at 176.
87 Roberts, supra note 23, at 55.
74
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white and Black abolitionists disagreed with this interpretation of the Constitution,
insisting that it could be used to challenge slavery even before the Reconstruction
Amendments were ratified.88 While initially agreeing with Garrison that the
Constitution was inherently a “pro-slavery instrument” that abolitionists should not
support, Douglass converted “to the antislavery side after years of careful
consideration and abolitionist activism including publishing his paper, lecturing
against slavery, and concealing fugitive slaves.”89 As he described in his
autobiography, he came to this conclusion after a:
course of thought and reading . . . that the Constitution of the United
States—inaugurated to ‘form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty’—could not have been
designed at the same time to maintain and perpetuate a system of rapine
and murder like slavery.90
It is wrong, however, to understand Douglass as underestimating the work
required for genuine abolitionism irrespective of how the Constitution was
interpreted. Douglass argued that the Civil War would ultimately decide “which of
the two, Freedom or Slavery, shall give law to this republic.”91 But, as Jennifer
McAward has noted, Douglass also wrote an article in the Rochester North Star in
1849 in which he expressed concern “that even after emancipation, there would be
‘long and dark . . . years through which the freed bondman will have to pass’ to
cleanse himself of the badge of slavery.”92
Unfortunately, history has shown that the U.S. Constitution has helped
perpetuate the badges and incidents of slavery,93 even after the ratification of the
Civil War Amendments. Andrew Johnson reflected the white supremacy values of
his time when he ascended to the Presidency following Lincoln’s assassination on
April 14, 1865. In his December 1867 message to Congress, after the Thirteenth
Amendment had been ratified, Johnson proclaimed that Black people possessed less
“capacity for government than any other race of people. No independent government
of any form has even been successful in their hands. On the contrary, wherever they
have been left to their own devices they have shown a constant tendency to relapse

88 Id.
89 Id.

at 55–58.
at 59.

90 Id.
91 Id.

at 61.
Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 561, 577 n.71 (2012).
93 See id. at 577–78 (providing a historical analysis of the meaning of the badges,
incidents, and vestiges of slavery).
92
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into barbarism.”94 Historian Eric Foner characterizes this statement as “probably the
most blatantly racist pronouncement ever to appear in an official state paper of an
American President.”95
Not surprisingly, President Johnson used his veto authority to stall even modest
improvements in the lives of newly freed people. He vetoed the Freedman’s Bureau
Bill of 1866, repudiating the very idea of Congress constituting a Freedman’s
Bureau. He argued that the limited economic assistance contemplated under the Act
would produce “immense patronage” and criticized the notion that Congress would
be “called upon to provide economic relief, establish schools, or purchase land for
‘our own people’; such aid, moreover, would injure the ‘character’ and ‘prospects’
of the freedmen by implying that they did not have to work for a living.”96 Further,
Johnson insisted that “clothing blacks with the privileges of citizenship
discriminated against whites – ‘the distinction of race and color is by the bill made
to operate in favor of the colored and against the white race.’”97 In a telling interplay,
when Johnson asked during a rally, “What does the veto mean?” A voice from the
crowd shouted, “It is keeping the n--- down.”98 As Foner observes, “Johnson voiced
themes that to this day have sustained opposition to federal intervention on behalf
of blacks.”99 Congress was not able to override his veto.100
It is helpful to pause and consider Johnson’s views in comparison to modern
views about race discrimination. Notice how Johnson equated discrimination against
white people as being as bad (or worse) than discrimination against Black people.
He tied a concern about discrimination against white people with an attempt to keep
“the n--- down.” Today, by comparison, it is elementary that discrimination against
white people is considered as constitutionally suspect as discrimination against
Black people.101 The courts have abandoned an anti-subordination perspective102
under which they could understand the Constitution as a tool to help Black people
overcome the legacy of slavery. Thus, it is no surprise that, as Asad Rahim’s careful
historical work demonstrates, Justice Powell’s diversity rationale in Bakke was not
rooted in “his longstanding commitment to integration and racial equality.”103 Before
joining the Court, Powell “spent nearly two decades resisting compulsory
integration . . . [and] traveled the country telling audiences that African Americans

94 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877,
180 (1988).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 247.
97 Id. at 250.
98 Id. at 251.
99 Id. at 248.
100 Id. at 249.
101 For an excellent discussion of the evolution of this view in the Bakke decision, see
Asad Rahim, Diversity to Deradicalize, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1423 (2020).
102 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1066 (1986).
103 Rahim, supra note 101, at 1431.
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were owed nothing for injustices of the past.”104 While it would not be correct to
equate Johnson’s overt racism with Powell’s opposition to compulsory racial
integration, both provide helpful illustration of the early roots of the formal equality
perspective that contends that society needs to protect white people from race
discrimination. Historically, it is important to document the consistency of that
formal equality view from the late nineteenth century to the present time.
In the nineteenth century, Johnson’s opposition to reconstruction placed him at
odds with the Republican majority in Congress. Johnson favored “almost total
amnesty to ex-Confederates, a program of rapid restoration of U.S.-state status for
the seceded states, and the approval of new, local Southern governments, which were
able to legislate ‘Black Codes’ that preserved the system of slavery in all but its
name.”105
Ironically, Johnson’s resistance to racial equality may have helped spur the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.106 Congress may have concluded that the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was more urgently needed because,
without such an amendment, they would lack the authority to invalidate the Black
Codes and enact civil rights legislation.107 But the Fourteenth Amendment was, in
many ways, a modest document. It did not guarantee suffrage to the people who
were newly freed. It did invalidate the Black Codes and give power to Congress to
enact a Civil Rights Act pursuant to its Section 5 powers.108 Yet, as Foner argues,
the Fourteenth Amendment did not reflect a break with the principles of federalism.
“Most Republicans assumed the states would retain the largest authority over local
affairs.”109 The Civil Rights Act placed enormous power in the hands of the judiciary
to enforce civil rights.110 That mechanism “appeared preferable to maintaining
indefinitely a standing army in the South, or establishing a permanent national
bureaucracy empowered to oversee Reconstruction.”111 The judiciary, however, as
we have seen in more recent times, can reflect Johnson’s attitude that providing civil
rights to Black people constitutes discrimination against whites.112

Id. at 1431.
This Day in History, February 24, 1868: President Andrew Johnson Impeached,
HISTORY (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/president-andrewjohnson-impeached [https://perma.cc/9BZ8-LDSC].
106 See generally Landmark Legislation: The Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/14thAmendment.htm [https:
//perma.cc/T2NB-LJGK] (last visited Aug. 21, 2021) (explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment passed the Senate on June 8, 1866 and was ratified by the states on July 9, 1868).
107 FONER, supra note 94, at 257 (“Republicans proposed to abrogate the Black Codes
and eliminate any doubts as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act.”).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 259.
110 Id. at 258 (“Now, discriminatory state laws could be overturned by the federal courts
regardless of which party dominated Congress.”).
111 Id.
112 See infra Part II.
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In 1869, Congress finally ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, providing the right
to vote to Black men.113 But “the Amendment said nothing about the right to hold
office and failed to make voting requirements ‘uniform throughout the land,’ as
many Radicals desired . . . [It] did not forbid literacy, property, and educational tests
that, while nonracial, might effectively exclude the majority of [B]lacks from the
polls.”114 The limitations of the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment are still with us
today, as states are free to use various voting suppression tactics to disenfranchise
large swaths of the Black electorate.115
Thus, the challenge for abolitionists, since the settling of the American
colonies, is a power elite who castigated Black people if they were poor and also if
they were well-educated and more affluent. During the colonial era, the power elite
took the view that emancipation would lead to a large vagrant poor who would be
the source of social disorder.116 In response, white abolitionists pushed for “model
Black behavior” to deflect such concerns through the development of Black
churches and schools.117 Such efforts, however, provoked rather than deflected
racism. “Many whites took umbrage at African Americans who supposedly stepped
out of their place by displaying economic independence, political assertiveness, and
social skills.”118 These views were not regional; they were found in the South as well
as in New England.119
In fact, as Kendi has persuasively documented,120 white supremacist ideology
has been a major force in United States life since European settlers descended on
and occupied Native American soil. Passage of various laws, election of various
representatives, and ratification of various constitutional amendments did not
magically cause that ideology to end. In fact, these events may have spurred
additional energy to undermine any anti-racist advances. President Andrew Johnson
based much of his presidency on undermining the anti-slavery efforts of President
113 FONER, supra note 94, at 446 (“In February 1869, Congress approved the Fifteenth
Amendment, prohibiting the federal and state governments from depriving any citizen of the
vote on racial grounds.”).
114 Id.
115 President Biden, for example, has described Georgia’s new voting law as “Jim Crow
on steroids.” Derek Thompson, The Truth About Georgia’s Voter Law, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8,
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/georgia-voting-rights-fiasco/618
537/ [https://perma.cc/NR57-N72Q]; see also Edward Lempinen, Stacking the Deck: How
the GOP Works to Suppress Minority Voting, BERKELEY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/09/29/stacking-the-deck-how-the-gop-works-to-suppressminority-voting/ [https://perma.cc/PF34-CTZG] (“While vote suppression targeting people
of color is a grim tradition in U.S. elections, this year [2020] the election process itself has
become a central campaign issue.”).
116 See SINHA, supra note 49, at 115.
117 Id. at 115.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Kendi, supra note 22 (explaining that the election of Donald Trump signals a
change away from racial progress and towards racist progress and that there is “a progression
of racism that historically has come after racial progress”).
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Abraham Lincoln,121 while President Donald Trump devoted much of his presidency
to undermining the modest anti-racist reforms achieved under President Barack
Obama.122 Racism and anti-racism have always co-existed in American life and
politics. Gains by abolitionists have never dismantled white supremacy; at most,
they have attained incremental reforms while simultaneously inflaming the seeds of
white supremacy.
II. THE CONSTITUTION’S ROLE IN PERPETUATING RACIAL INEQUALITY
A. Slavery Not Ever Abolished
When drafted, the Constitution facilitated the continued existence of slavery.
Slaves were defined as three-fifths of a person for purposes of political
representation for white people.123 This provision helped ensure that Black people
in the South would remain enslaved while white southerners benefitted politically
from their status and unpaid labor. The drafters of the Constitution were well aware
of the purpose behind the Three-Fifths Clause. Gouverneur Morris unsuccessfully
moved to require inhabitants to be “free” to be counted for the purposes of political
representation, making the moral argument that:
[t]he admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained
comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S.C. who goes to the Coast
of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away
his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to the
most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for the
protection of the rights of mankind, than the Citizens of Pa. or N. Jersey
who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.124
Morris argued that the continuation of slavery was the “curse of heaven.”125
The Constitution also prevented any legislative interference with the slave trade
until 1808126 and made the Northern colonies complicit in the perpetuation of slavery
by requiring the return of escaped slaves to their masters.127 The United States
121 FONER, supra note 94, at 247–51 (documenting what Foner calls Johnson’s “blatant
racism”).
122 It is impossible to summarize all the Trump-era policy changes that rolled back the
Obama administration’s efforts to address racial bias, but this article discusses a few. See
Katy O’Donnell, Trump Rolling Back Obama Efforts on Racial Bias, POLITICO (May 8, 2019,
9:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/08/trump-obama-racial-bias-522940
[https://perma.cc/DL8U-B5MR].
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
124 Madison Debates: August 8, 1787, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_808.asp [https://perma.cc/E5GB-2YNJ] (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
125 Id.
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
127 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3.
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Congress codified that rule in 1793 with the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act.128
The Act “allowed for the capture and return of runaway enslaved people within the
territory of the United States . . . [It] authorized local governments to seize and return
escapees to their owners and imposed penalties on anyone who aided in their
flight.”129
Although the Fugitive Slave Act was enacted by the Second United States
Congress, some Northern states, such as Pennsylvania, sought to defy the Act by
passing their own laws that made it illegal for anyone to attempt to use force or
violence to kidnap a “negro or mulatto” to take them out of state.130
The Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to preclude such efforts.131
Edward Prigg, upon the request of Margaret Ashmore, a slave owner, had gone to
Pennsylvania to kidnap Margaret Morgan, an enslaved person and return her to the
slave-holding state of Maryland. Prigg was indicted for violating Pennsylvania
law.132 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Joseph
Story (an anti-slavery northerner from Massachusetts), ruled that the Pennsylvania
law was unconstitutional and could not be used to indict Prigg, because:
The act of the legislature of Pennsylvania upon which the indictment
against Edward Prigg is founded, is unconstitutional and void; it purports
to punish as a public offence against the state, the very act of seizing and
removing a slave by his master, which the constitution of the United States
was designed to justify and uphold.133
The Court emphasized that the Fugitive Slave Clause was an essential aspect
of the Constitutional design. Before the Constitution was ratified, some Northern
states openly resisted the return of fugitive slaves.134 According to the United States
Supreme Court, the South relied on the expectation that regulation of fugitive slaves
could only happen by Congress. “The history of the times proves, that the [S]outh
regarded and relied upon it, as an ample security to the owners of slave property.”135
By striking down the Pennsylvania legislation as unconstitutional, the Court
made it clear that the Constitution did not merely preserve slavery in the South, but
it precluded the northern states from taking any steps to assist people who were
fugitive slaves. The North was required to allow the Fugitive Slave Act to operate

Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (enacted by the 2nd United States
Congress, repealed 1864).
129 Fugitive Slave Acts, HISTORY (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.history.com/topics/
black-history/fugitive-slave-acts [https://perma.cc/F2GN-3QA2].
130 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 551 (1842).
131 Id. at 625–26.
132 Id. at 561.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 564.
135 Id.
128
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within its borders to further the ends of the white supremacist constitution. And
despite some Northern resistance, the Fugitive Slave Act was updated in 1850,
decades after the Constitution permitted Congress to abolish slavery.136
Some state courts tried to resist the use of the Constitution to perpetuate slavery,
but those attempts were overturned by the Supreme Court. For example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to an abolitionist who
was arrested under the Fugitive Slave Act on the grounds that the Act was
unconstitutional, holding that the Magna Carta was a proper source for defining the
due process rights of the person arrested for seeking to assist fugitive slaves.137
Those arguments were unsuccessful; the United States Supreme Court continued to
conclude in 1859 that Congress’s power to enact a fugitive slave law and have
exclusive jurisdiction over those people who tried to assist fugitive slaves was
essential to the constitutional design.138
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the limited success achieved in
some state courts. To the extent that the Wisconsin Supreme Court could imagine a
violation of due process rights, its exclusive focus was on the rights of the person
seeking to assist the fugitive slave. Whether slaves were actually “persons” who
were entitled to be “free” when they entered the state of Wisconsin was beyond the
scope of the Wisconsin court’s consideration.139 Thus, as of 1850, both anti-slavery
Justice Joseph Story and the comparatively liberal Wisconsin Supreme Court
declined to take any steps that would have directly freed slaves that escaped to the
north. They did not question the Constitutional design that permitted and protected
slavery while never mentioning the word itself.
In a little-told story, the lawyers who represented fugitive slaves in the 1850s
understood the futility of their legal arguments.140 They saw fugitive slave cases “as
a venue for a vigorous rhetorical proxy battle against slavery.”141 The lawyers “used
the procedural tools within that system both to achieve the best possible outcomes
136 Fugitive

Slave Acts, supra note 129.
In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 66 (Wis. 1854).
138 See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1859).
139 The Court in In re Booth emphasized that:
137 See

We are aware that it has been said that slaves are not persons in the sense in which
that term is used in the amendment to the constitution above referred to. But this,
admitting it to be true, does not affect the question under consideration, as persons
who are free are liable to be arrested and deprived of their liberty by virtue of this
act, without having had a trial by a jury of their peers. We do not propose to
discuss the question whether a slave escaping from the state where he is held to
service or labor, into a state where slavey does not exist, thereby becomes free by
virtue of the local law, subject only to be delivered up to be returned again to
servitude, as it is a question not necessarily involved in the consideration of the
subject before us.
In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 66– 67.
140 See Farbman, supra note 8.
141 Id. at 1882.
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for their clients, and to obstruct and dismantle the system itself.”142 They understood
the premise of this Article that the white supremacist constitution was not a likely
source of legal relief, but nonetheless, they concluded that making arguments against
the barbarity of these laws could be a step in an important political struggle to end
slavery.143
The Supreme Court’s insistence that the Fugitive Slave Act (as a federal statute)
was presumptively supreme was in stark contrast to the Court’s infamous decision
(two years earlier) in Dred Scott v. Sandford.144 In Dred Scott, the Court, in a 7-2
decision, ruled that a federal statute, the Missouri Compromise of 1820, was
unconstitutional.145 That conclusion invalidated Dred Scott’s claim to state
citizenship.146 Pursuant to the Missouri Compromise of 1820, Dred Scott became a
free man when his owner took him to Illinois (a state where slavery was forbidden
by its state constitution) and to Fort Snelling (where slavery was forbidden by the
Missouri Compromise).147 Arguing that he was a citizen of Illinois, Dred Scott
sought to sue for his freedom under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction.148
For the first time since Marbury v. Madison149, the Supreme Court in Dred Scott
invalidated a federal statute. Further, the Court expansively interpreted the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to conclude that the federal government was
seeking to deprive citizens (i.e., slave owners) of their property (i.e., slaves) without
just compensation and due process of law.150
For our purposes, the most important part of the Dred Scott decision was its
originalist methodology. The Court concluded that free Black people could not be
citizens because they “were at [the time the Constitution was drafted] considered as
a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant
race . . . [having] no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and
the Government might choose to grant them.”151 This was considered to be the “fixed
and universal” view of the ratifiers of the Constitution.152
The Dred Scott decision is probably glossed over in many constitutional law
courses as a politically disastrous decision that was a key factor in leading the United
States to a civil war. While that description may, in hindsight, be accurate, the more
important point is that the decision was structured in originalist methodology that
was consistent with the longstanding understanding of the Constitution’s original
intent regarding slavery and the rights of all Black people. Black people were
142 Id.
143
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considered a “subordinate” and “inferior” class of beings, even by many who
described themselves as abolitionists.153 To argue, as did some anti-slavery
advocates,154 that slavery should end because it was immoral was not necessarily to
argue that Black people were equal to white people. The Constitution was founded
on the premise that Black people were inferior to white people.
B. The Civil War Amendments’ Evisceration
Following the end of the Civil War, a sea change arguably occurred in U.S.
history. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments were ratified during
a contentious struggle in which Democratic President Andrew Johnson, who became
President upon the assassination of Republican President Abraham Lincoln, opposed
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.155
In theory, one could construe the language of these amendments as furthering
an abolitionist understanding of the Constitution.156 The Thirteenth Amendment
seemingly abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, furthering the argument that
no one had the legal or moral authority to own another person.157 Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment overturned Dred Scott by providing that persons born in the
United States are U.S. citizens as well as citizens of the states in which they reside.158
It also prohibited states from violating a citizen’s privileges or immunities and a
person’s right to due process and equal protection.159 The Fifteenth Amendment
prohibited the denial of the right to vote on the basis of race.160
153 See

KENDI, supra note 25, at 165, 178.
supra Part I.
155 See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III:
Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 1275, 1279
(2013) (arguing that originalist accounts of the Fourteenth Amendment have “completely
missed President Johnson’s important role as leader of the Anti-Amendment Party in the
drama of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the de facto national head of the Democratic Party,
Johnson took the lead in crafting arguments against the Amendment”).
156 See JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); DAVID A.J.
RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments
should be understood as supporting an abolitionist perspective).
157 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
158 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”).
159 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; not deny to any person . . . the equal
protection of the laws.”).
160 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
154 See
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With the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment presided over by a deeply
racist Andrew Johnson in the White House, the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception
for involuntary servitude “as a punishment for crime” helped slavery persist in all
but name. With the support of President Johnson, who had granted broad amnesty
for former Confederates, the South “barred Blacks from voting, elected
Confederates as politicians, and instituted a series of discriminatory Black codes at
their constitutional conventions to reformulate their state in the summer and fall of
1865. With the Thirteenth Amendment barring slavery ‘except as a punishment for
crime,’ the law replaced the master.”161 In more recent years, the Thirteenth
Amendment has not been able to serve as a bar to convict labor.162
The Supreme Court initially interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
consistently with an abolitionist agenda.163 As the nation retreated from offering
protections to newly freed people, and instead imposed a reign of terror upon them,
the Supreme Court likewise retreated from using the Fourteenth Amendment as an
instrument to dismantle white supremacy. Two important aspects of the Fourteenth
Amendment were construed in a way that precluded an abolitionist agenda—the
Equal Protection Clause in Section One and the Congressional Power Clause in
Section Five. I will tell this story chronologically.
Despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s seemingly broad language, the Supreme
Court began an immediate and long-term process of interpreting those provisions
narrowly. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court held that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause did not preclude the states from implementing a local
monopoly.164 While that opinion did not relate directly to race discrimination, its
underlying logic reflects the many ways that the Fourteenth Amendment has been
narrowly interpreted. The Court emphasized that ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not subject states to the control of Congress nor change “the whole
theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of
both these governments to the people.”165 In other words, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s broad prohibitions against state action did not undermine the system
of federalism that empowers state’s rights. Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause was interpreted narrowly so that states could deny women the right to
161 KENDI, supra note 25, at 235. For further discussion of the Punishment Clause of
the Thirteenth Amendment, see Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime:
The Punishment Clause and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607 (2008).
162 See generally Michael Scimone, More to Lose Than Your Chains: Realizing the
Ideals of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 175 (2008); Ryan S. Marion,
Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case Against State Private Prison
Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213 (2009); Alexandria Gutierrez, Sufferings
Peculiarly Their Own: The Thirteenth Amendment, in Defense of Incarcerated Women’s
Reproductive Rights, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 117 (2013).
163 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down state law
excluding any but “white persons” from juries); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(striking down state law that effectively barred Chinese people from running laundries).
164 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
165 Id. at 78.

2022]

WHITE SUPREMACY

673

practice law and the right to vote.166 In other words, the term “privileges and
immunities” was given a narrow interpretation that has largely precluded it from
being a source for progressive reform despite calls from progressives to reconsider
its meaning.167
Similarly, the Court quickly narrowed the meaning of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That provision ambitiously gave Congress the authority “to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”168 Consistent with
an abolitionist agenda, Congress used that authority to enact laws in 1870 and 1871
to protect Black people from the terror of the Ku Klux Klan. The Enforcement Act
of 1870 prohibited groups of people from banding together “or [to] go in disguise
upon the public highways, or upon the premises of another” with the intention of
violating people’s constitutional rights.169 The Second Force Act, which became law
in 1871, placed administration of national elections under the control of the federal
government and empowered federal judges and United States marshals to supervise
local polling places.170 The Third Force Act, which became law in 1871, empowered
the President to use the armed forces to combat those who conspired to deny equal
protection of the laws and to suspend habeas corpus, if necessary, to enforce the
Act.171 These poorly funded Enforcement Acts caused the Klan to nominally
dissolve by 1871, “but the train of terror still rushed down the tracks under new
names”172 because of the lack of funding for a strong federal presence in the South.173
See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (holding that states could deny women
the right to practice law); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (holding that states could
deny women the right to vote).
167 Kevin Christopher Newsom noted that:
166

Novice students of constitutional law, upon encountering the Privileges or
Immunities Clause for the first time, are told by their professors (pausing ever so
briefly in the headlong rush toward the real meat of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses): ‘Privileges or Immunities? Don’t
worry about it. Justice Miller and the Slaughter-House Court decimated that
provision way back in 1873.
See, e.g., Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation
of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 646 (2000).
168 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
169
Enforcement Act of 1870, 41st Cong. Sess. 1 Ch. 114 (1870),
https://www.cop.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/image/EnforcementAct_1870_P
age_1.htm [https://perma.cc/P792-KYX9].
170 Enforcement Act of February 1871, 41st Cong. Sess. 3 Ch. 99 (1871),
https://www.cop.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/image/EnforcementAct_Feb187
1_Page_1.htm [https://perma.cc/P3AE-GMET].
171 Enforcement Act of April 1871, 42nd Cong. Sess. 1 Ch. 22 (1871),
https://www.cop.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/image/EnforcementAct_Apr187
1_Page_1.htm [https://perma.cc/EQX2-7BSS].
172 KENDI, supra note 25, at 249.
173 Id.
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Congress documented the continuing violence against Black people in the South in
1872 but then also explained that the violence was in response to the “bad legislation,
official incompetency, and corruption” of Black politicians.174 Meanwhile, white
Southerners “made it known to Black people . . . that ‘to vote against the wishes of
their white employers and neighbors was to risk death.’”175
While the Enforcement Acts required a strong federal presence to achieve their
ends, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was more promising. In the final Reconstruction
Bill enacted by Congress, it gave Black people the ability to use the federal courts
to challenge race discrimination in jury selection, transportation, and
accommodations.176 But the Supreme Court virtually wiped out the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 in its 1883 decision in The Civil Rights Cases.177 Although Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to “enforce” the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court in 1883 concluded that that power did not extend
to banning race discrimination by private actors.178 The decision began the creation
of a rigid “state action” doctrine that makes it very difficult to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to reach discriminatory conduct by private actors or even statesupported private actors. In the words of Justice Bradley:
civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals . . . The
wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such [State] authority,
is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual. . . . [I]t is not
individual offenses, but abrogation and denial of rights, which it
denounces, and for which [Section Five] clothes the Congress with power
to provide a remedy.179
In a vigorous and lone dissent, Justice Harlan argued that Congress’s power
should not be limited by that narrow interpretation of the state action doctrine. In an
argument that foreshadowed the perpetuation of white supremacy in the United
States through actions of private actors, Harlan said:
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and
managers of places of public amusement are agents of the State, because
they are charged with duties to the public, and are amenable, in respect of
their public duties and functions, to governmental regulation. It seems to
me that . . . a denial, by these instrumentalities of the State to the citizen,
because of his race, of that equality of civil rights secured to him by law,
is a denial by the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
174 Id.

at 252.

175 Id.
176 Id.

at 256.
generally United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

177 See
178 Id.
179

Id. at 17–18.
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If it be not, then that race is left, in respect of the civil rights in question,
practically at the mercy of corporations and individuals wielding power
under the States.180
Congress eventually found a way to regulate what Harlan calls “places of public
amusement” through its Commerce Clause powers,181 but the Court has never
revisited this narrow understanding of Congress’s enforcement authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s 8-1 vote, however, left little reason to expect
the majority’s reasoning to be reconsidered or abandoned.
As Charles Black forcefully argued in 1967, “the ‘state action’ problem is the
most important problem in American law.”182 Further, he contended that “the most
important single task to which American law must address itself is the task of
eradicating racism.”183 Finally, Black insisted that:
amenability of racial injustice to national legal correction is inversely
proportional to the durability and scope of the state action ‘doctrine,’ and
of the ways of thinking to which it is linked. It is not too much to have said
that the state action problem is the most important problem in American
law.184
Black argued that the continued presence of racism in American life is all the
evidence we need of state inaction, to which the Constitution should offer redress.185
He insisted that both Congress and the courts should be given the widest latitude to
use the Equal Protection Clause and Section Five as tools to eradicate such denials
of equality.186

180 Id.

at 58–59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
182 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967); see also Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State
Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 779 (2004) (extending Black’s
argument to the field of welfare rights).
183 Id. at 69.
184 Id. at 70.
185 Id. at 107.
186 Charles L. Black, Jr. explains that:
181

Racism, including that formally “private” racism that blots so much of
public life, is not only a national problem but the national problem. The racism
problem, in law, is now principally the “state action” problem; to be slow to
recognize state action, to complicate the concept with unwarranted limiting
technicalities, is to confirm racism pro tanto. “State action” questions, however
stated, are therefore national questions, questions for the Court and Congress, both
of them acting in keen consciousness of their being engaged in work of
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In 1896, the infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson187 made it difficult to use
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to end even state-sanctioned apartheid.
The Supreme Court first quoted from the Civil Rights Cases to observe that “the act
of a mere individual, the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or place of
amusement, refusing accommodations to colored people, cannot be justly regarded
as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but only as
involving an ordinary civil injury.”188 Further, the Court went on to declare that:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and
colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races,
and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from
the other race by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of
the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.189
In response to the argument that the state’s laws imposed a badge of inferiority on
Black people, the Court responded: “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.”190 While Plessy was eventually overturned, its limited view of state action
remains with us today—that the Constitution cannot be used as a tool to force states
to remedy the legacy of slavery.191
Justice John Marshall Harlan is often remembered as a powerful dissenter in
both Plessy and The Civil Rights Cases, but he also authored the Supreme Court’s
1899 opinion that upheld the segregation of Richmond County public schools in
Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County.192 In Cumming, Justice Harlan
concluded that it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment for Richmond County,
Georgia to use taxpayer dollars to provide for a public high school for white children
but no public high school for Black children.193 In addition to concluding that the
expenditure of state funds in that way was permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court also questioned whether it should even be involved in
questions about public education. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Harlan
said:
We may add that while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public
taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against any
exploratory interpretation that goes to the life of that one of our constitutional
guarantees most evidently rooted in justice.
Id. at 107.
187 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
188 Id. at 542–43.
189 Id. at 543.
190 Id. at 551.
191 See Black, supra note 182, at 107.
192 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
193 Id.
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class on account of their race, the education of people in schools
maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States,
and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the management
of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and
unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.194
In other words, the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
was quite narrow; even one of the Court’s most progressive jurists did not conclude
that the Equal Protection Clause disturbed basic principles of federalism by
requiring the states to mandate equal education on the basis of race.
The Supreme Court wrestled with the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
while Radical Reconstruction was making some headway in the South. The
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 had forced Southern States to adopt new constitutions
that did not deny the right to vote on the basis of race or color.195 According to
historian Eric Foner, “[w]hen not deterred by violence, blacks eagerly attended
political gatherings, and voted in extraordinary numbers; their turnout in many
elections approached 90 percent.”196 And Black people attained elective office in
significant numbers, with some state legislatures becoming majority Black.197
“Throughout the Republican South, the number of black officials rose significantly
in the early 1870s. Black representation in Congress grew from five to seven in 1873
and reached a Reconstruction peak of eight (representing six different states) in
1875.”198
But the withdrawal of federal troops as part of the Compromise of 1877199
heralded the end of Reconstruction and Black voting power in the southern United
States. From 1890 to 1908, every Confederate state produced new constitutions or
suffrage-restricting constitutional amendments.200 “The avowed purpose of these
new constitutions was to restore white supremacy . . . .”201 And the results were
devastating. In Alabama, which was the subject of an important lawsuit by Jackson

Id. at 545.
FONER, supra note 94, at 276–80, 452–53; see also KENDI, supra note 25, at 244
(describing effects of Reconstruction Acts).
196 Id. at 291.
197 See The First South Carolina Legislature After the 1867 Reconstruction Acts,
FACING HISTORY & OURSELVES, https://www.facinghistory.org/reconstruction-era/firstsouth-carolina-legislature [https://perma.cc/5HHE-HFLA] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
198 FONER, supra note 94, at 537–38.
199 See History.com Editors, Compromise of 1877, HISTORY CHANNEL (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/compromise-of-1877 [https://perma.cc/6W
B9-4UDW].
200 See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 301 (2000).
201 Id. at 301–02.
194

195 See
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Giles,202 the number of eligible black voters declined from 181,471 to 3,000 when
the new rules went into effect in 1900.203
Despite the glaring evidence that the Democrats were using these newly
amended Constitutions to disenfranchise Black people, the Supreme Court refused
to intervene. In 1903, in an opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes,
with another Harlan dissent, the Supreme Court failed to overturn the refusal of
Alabama voting officials to register more than 5,000 qualified Black voters.204 As
persuasively demonstrated by Richard Pildes, the Court did not intervene because it
was inconceivable that it would enter an order that required a court to supervise
voting. “No doubt Holmes, in particular, viewed the complaint as an invitation for
courts, in essence, to re-initiate Reconstruction, or perhaps even the Civil War.”205
One had to wonder if the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had been repealed
while former slaves struggled under conditions of dire poverty and grave injustice.
The idea that the Constitution could be used as a tool to help disadvantaged
members of society was suggested in the famous footnote four from Carolene
Products206 in 1938. While upholding the authority of Congress to regulate the
interstate shipment of milk under a relaxed standard of judicial review, the Court
suggested that a more “searching” judicial review should take place when a statute
is directed at particular religious, national, or racial minorities where there is likely
to be “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” and a limited political
process that cannot be “relied upon to protect minorities.”207 The Carolene Products
footnote was sometimes used to strike down state action,208 but it did not prevent the
imposition of internment camps on Japanese Americans during the Second World
War.209
While the Roberts Court has explicitly repudiated Korematsu210 (despite
upholding restrictions on Muslims seeking to enter the United States),211 the
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
supra note 200, at 303–04.
204 Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
205 Pildes, supra note 200, at 306.
206 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
207 Id. at 152 n.4.
208 See W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (prohibiting religious
minorities from being required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance); see also Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to racially restrictive
covenants).
209 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
210 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“The dissent’s reference to
Korematsu, however affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already
obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the
court of history, and – to be clear – ‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’” (quoting
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
211 Id. (upholding Presidential Proclamation 9645 despite statements by President
Trump and administration officials that the proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim
animus).
202

203 Pildes,
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important historical lesson is that the Court never interprets the Fourteenth
Amendment progressively to remedy racial injustice at the time in which the
consequences of that racial injustice are the starkest. Cummings did not invalidate
racial segregation after Radical Reconstruction ended; Korematsu did not release
Japanese-American people from internment camps during the Second World War;
even Brown itself offered no immediate relief to the plaintiffs; the Court insisted on
hearing re-argument on the issue of remedy.212 As Jordan Steiker has noted, “[t]hat
there was a ‘Brown II’ did not portend well for the plaintiffs, because the background
assumption in constitutional law—which required no additional briefing or
argument—was that the plaintiffs’ demonstration of a constitutional violation
entitled them to immediate, personal relief and an injunction against future
constitutional misconduct.”213 Further, the court issued its decision in Brown after
the school district at issue had already voluntarily ended its practice of racial
segregation; and public schools remain as segregated as ever under segregated
housing patterns and white flight from public schools.214 The Constitution has
routinely failed to be a contemporary tool to overcome white supremacy.
To be clear, Southern constitutions were amended in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century to re-establish white supremacy after the end of Radical
Reconstruction.215 The Supreme Court decisions invalidating those measures have
occurred in the late twentieth or early twenty-first centuries, nearly a century after
the measures were enacted. For example, in 1967, nine years after the Lovings were
convicted under the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute and forced to live in another
state, the Supreme Court invalidated that statute in Loving v. Virginia.216 The statute
had survived judicial attack for more than a half-century despite its title “An Act to
Preserve Racial Integrity.”217 In Hunter v. Underwood,218 in 1985, the Supreme
Court invalidated a long list of 1901 measures designed to disenfranchise Black
voters and maintain white supremacy. In 2020, the Supreme Court invalidated a
nonunanimous jury requirement in Louisiana, which had been adopted by
constitutional convention in 1898 to help maintain a steady pool of Black convicts

212 See

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Jordan M. Steiker, Brown’s Descendants, 52 HOWARD L.J. 583, 608 (2009).
214 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Racial Integration as a Compelling Interest, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 15, 16–20 (2004) (detailing the continuing prevalence of racial segregation in
public schools and American society).
215 This era is usually referred to by the name “Jim Crow.” See Jim Crow Laws, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/freedom-riders-jim-crow-laws/
[https://perma.cc/X8VG-BL3Q] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021).
216 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
217 Id. at 11 n.11.
218 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
213
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to be used within the convict leasing system.219 One committee chairman described
the purpose of this and other provisions as to “establish the supremacy of the white
race.”220
Although much attention in recent years has been placed on the concept of
implicit bias,221 the attempts to maintain white supremacy have scarcely been subtle.
As the Supreme Court recounted in its 1985 decision in Hunter, the delegates to the
all-white Alabama constitutional convention in 1901 could not have been clearer
that their purpose was to turn back Radical Reconstruction and re-establish a system
of white supremacy.222 Convention President John B. Knox proclaimed: “And what
is it that we want to do? Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal
Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this State.”223 The Constitution has
never been designed or interpreted to end white supremacy.
C. Turning Brown on Its Head
One might argue that there was a brief window in U.S. history, sometimes
called the Second Reconstruction,224 when the Constitution was used to dismantle
white supremacy. Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education225 and Bolling v.
Sharpe,226 the Supreme Court was arguably willing to seek ways to dismantle racial
apartheid in the United States by requiring local school districts to integrate their
public schools. These abolitionist steps, however, ended in the 1970s as the Supreme
Court balked at instituting effective remedies that would truly integrate the public

219 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394, 1408 (2020); see also Jessica
Rosgaard & Wallis Watkins, The History of Louisiana’s Non-Unanimous Jury Rule, WWNO
(Oct. 22, 2018, 5:16 PM), https://www.wwno.org/politics/2018-10-22/the-history-oflouisianas-non-unanimous-jury-rule [https://perma.cc/P3RQ-JH7K] (describing the history
of the provision as furthering white supremacy).
220 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
221 See Frank Harty & Haley Hermanson, Implicit Bias Evidence: A Compendium of
Cases and Admissibility Model, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 2, 5 (2020); Michael Selmi, The
Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 194–96
(2018).
222 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229.
223 Id.
224 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1945–1968, https://history.house.
gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Civil-RightsMovement/ [https://perma.cc/BZC9-YDUR].
225 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (declaring state-mandated school segregation unconstitutional
under Fourteenth Amendment).
226 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (declaring that segregation of D.C. public
schools violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
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schools227 and refused to dismantle the system of property-tax funded education that
maintained the superiority of suburban white schools.228
The Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez229 is often not given enough attention in understanding the Court’s
movement away from racial justice. The San Antonio case was brought by MexicanAmerican parents who challenged the funding of public schools by property taxes
in a lawsuit that was filed in 1968.230 Drawing on court decisions striking down poll
taxes and on cases that emphasized the importance of public education, the parents
argued that the school-funding scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause.231 A 3judge district court panel entered a per curiam opinion concluding that “the current
method of state financing for public elementary and secondary education deprives
their class of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.”232 The
per curiam panel found that strict scrutiny applied because lines “drawn on the basis
of wealth or property” should be immediately suspect, especially in the context of
public education.233 Concluding that the state could not meet the compelling interest
standard, the court ruled that the current system of funding education was
unconstitutional and gave the state two years to devise a system that would comply
with its holding.234
In an opinion authored by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed.235 The
Court found that wealth classifications did not have the indicia of suspectness that
would warrant strict scrutiny. Leaning on footnote four from Carolene Products, the
Court found that strict scrutiny should be limited to a class that is “subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.”236 Poor, Mexican-American families whose children received a
substandard quality of public education, as compared with white children who lived
in more affluent neighborhoods, qualified for no more than low-level rational basis
review.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974) (overturning the lower court order
that would have required busing school children between inner city Detroit into the Detroit
suburbs); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (reversing the court of appeals
which had ordered aggressive remedies to dismantle racial segregation in public schools in
DeKalb, Georgia); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (overturning the trial court’s
order requiring the state to fund inner-city schools to attract white students from the suburbs).
228 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting the
claim that Texas’ system of funding education unconstitutionally discriminated against poor
people and Mexican Americans).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 4–6.
231 Id. at 17–19.
232 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1.
233 Id. at 283.
234 Id. at 286.
235 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
236 Id. at 28.
227
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Justice Marshall’s eloquent dissent disagreed with what he called the majority’s
“rigidified approach to equal protection analysis.”237 Marshall argued that:
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied
a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.238
By contrast, the majority concluded that the combination of poverty, race, and
education were not sufficient indicators to warrant any kind of heightened scrutiny,
erasing the significance of the national origin of the plaintiffs.239
The most charitable reading of Rodriguez is that the Court was limiting its use
of strict scrutiny to cases involving individuals, like Black people, who have suffered
a history of purposeful discrimination. But that reading was soon erased in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke. The Bakke decision turned the Equal Protection
Clause into a tool to eradicate state and local governments’ attempts to remedy a
legacy of racism. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,240 the Supreme
Court invalidated the University of California’s racial preferential admissions
program for 16 of the 100 places in its medical school class.241 Whether one
interpreted the Court’s opinion as limiting what a university could do pursuant to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, the message was clear: White men could use the legacy of
Brown to argue that they were suffering from race discrimination.242 The language
from Carolene Products suggesting that close judicial scrutiny was reserved for
those who constituted a “discrete and insular minority”243 was dead.
The often-heralded opinion by Justice Powell in Bakke was an important step
toward erasing what I have called an anti-subordination understanding244 of the
Equal Protection Clause. As Ian Haney López has perceptively observed, Justice
Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 98–99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 18.
240 Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387–88 (1978).
241 Id. at 279.
242 For further discussion, see Rahim, supra note 101.
243 United States v. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“Nor need we
inquire whether . . . prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.”).
244 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1038 (1986).
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Powell abandoned his Carolene Products approach in Bakke when he “contended
that this inquiry was superfluous in race cases . . . .”245 Thus, Alan Bakke, a white
man seeking admission to medical school, could take advantage of strict scrutiny
while the poor, Mexican-American parents seeking more equitable K-12 public
school funding could not take advantage of strict scrutiny.
Justice Marshall’s dissent provides a history lesson in why the invocation of
formal equality, to allow Bakke to take advantage of strict scrutiny, makes no sense.
First, Marshall reminds us that 350 years ago:
[T]he Negro was dragged to this country in chains to be sold into slavery.
Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage for forced labor, the
slave was deprived of all legal rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read;
he could be sold away from his family and friends at the whim of his
master; and killing or maiming him was not a crime.246
Further, Marshall reminds us that the Thirteenth Amendment may have “free[d]
the Negro from slavery,” but it “did not bring him citizenship or equality in any
meaningful way . . . The combined actions and inactions of the State and Federal
Governments maintained Negroes in a position of legal inferiority for another
century after the Civil War.”247 Marshall also argued: “The position of the Negro
today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal
treatment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful
equality remains a distant dream for the Negro.”248 Marshall ended his opinion by
comparing the Court’s decision to that of Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, saying that
he “fear[ed] that we have come full circle . . . [with] this Court again stepping in,
this time to stop affirmative-action programs of the type used by the University of
California.”249 Although the majority may have thought it was permitting some
continued use of affirmative action, Justice Marshall’s understanding of the meaning
of Bakke rings true today.
Beginning with the Bakke decision, it is hard to find cases in which Black
people successfully argue that they were victims of unconstitutional race
discrimination. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,250 the Supreme Court
dismantled the Minority Business Enterprise program that was created in Richmond,
Virginia to remedy the history of Black contractors obtaining only 0.67% of the
Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1034 (2007). According to Haney López, Powell
replaced a racial analysis with an ethnic analysis. “Powell deployed ethnicity to locate all
groups in the same position, that of temporary minorities similarly engaged in pluralist
politics and facing the same levels of societal hostility—and all deserving an identical level
of judicial protection.” Id. at 1037.
246 Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387–88 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 390.
248 Id. at 395.
249 Id. at 402.
250 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
245
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city’s prime construction contracts despite constituting 50% of the city’s
population.251 In a 6-3 decision, the all-white majority substituted its opinion
regarding the effect of racial affirmative measures for that of the majority-Black city
council. The Supreme Court concluded that the city council misunderstood the ways
that this program would further racial prejudice or stereotypes against Black people.
The Court found that such programs “promote notions of racial inferiority and lead
to a politics of racial hostility.”252 In a scathing dissent, Justice Marshall, the only
Black member of the Court, argued that interpreting the Civil War Amendments to
proscribe such state remedial measures “turns the Amendments on their heads” in
light of the historical evidence that the purpose of such laws was to respond to “racial
violence or discrimination against newly freed slaves.”253 Thus, the five Black
members of the city council and the only Black member of the Supreme Court
thought such programs were essential to eliminating the badges, incidents, and
vestiges of slavery, but the all-white majority of the Supreme Court found otherwise.
Bakke and Croson opened a floodgate of litigation to challenge state and local
government remedial attempts to respond to dire racial inequality. While the holistic
review of student applications at Michigan Law School, where race was one of many
diversity factors, was upheld as constitutional with a suggested sunset in 2028 in
Grutter v. Bollinger,254 the University of Michigan’s awarding of 20 points on the
150-point scale to any underrepresented minority applicant who applied for
admission to the undergraduate program was struck down as unconstitutional in
Gratz v. Bollinger.255 The Gratz majority decision found it unconstitutional to use
race in such a mechanical way. It interpreted the admissions program as treating race
as the only plus factor.256 As noted by the dissent, however, applicants could also
receive an additional “20 points for athletic ability, socioeconomic disadvantage,
attendance at a socioeconomically disadvantaged or predominantly minority high
school, or at the Provost’s discretion.”257 Even with the operation of this affirmative
program, students from underrepresented minority groups were still a distinct
minority at the university.258 In Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, she points out that white
applicants had ample opportunities to gain admission notwithstanding this
affirmative program and that it was better for a university to be transparent about its
251 Id.

at 480.
at 493.
253 Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
254 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
255 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
256 Id. at 271–72 (“[T]he LSA’s automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of
making the ‘factor of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified
underrepresented minority applicant” thereby not acting consistently with Justice Powell’s
Bakke opinion (quoting Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978))).
257 Id. at 294–95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
258 In 2003, Black students comprised 410 of the 5,550 students (7.4%) in the first-year
class. See UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN – ANN ARBOR, COMMON DATA SET, 2003–2004,
https://obp.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/pubdata/cds/cds_2003-2004_umaa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C7NR-JYJF].
252 Id.
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admissions policy rather than try to achieve the same results through “winks, nods,
and disguises.”259 The majority decision granted an injunction to prevent the
University of Michigan from continuing its program of considering race as one of
many factors for which a candidate could earn 20 points.260 The overwhelmingly
white legacy admission candidates could still request the Provost to intervene to
benefit their privileged offspring.261
In Michigan itself, the Grutter decision was short-lived as the state’s voters
passed an initiative to eliminate affirmative action at state universities.262 While the
state had a very limited path available to even enact race-based affirmative action in
admissions, this anti-racial-equality measure by the voters was found to be
constitutionally permissible.263 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by
Justice Ginsburg) explained why a proper understanding of the Civil Rights
Amendments would prohibit the state voters from using the initiative process to
stymy the rights of racial minorities to participate in the political process.264
Sotomayor said:
Race matters. Race matters in part because of the long history of
racial minorities’ being denied access to the political process . . . Race also
matters because of persistent racial inequality in society — inequality that
cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities
. . . . And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, that cannot
be discussed any other way, and that cannot be wished away.265
She sharply disagreed with the conclusion of the majority that this initiative by
voters in Michigan did not constitute “invidious” discrimination.266 In looking at the
Court’s evolution of its understanding of the meaning of the Civil War Amendments,
it is important to recognize that only one member of the Court joined Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case,
but Justice Breyer concurred with the plurality’s decision in favor of the initiative.267
Thus, a Supreme Court majority both constrained the very limited form of
affirmative action that the university could choose and then allowed the voters, in a
Gratz, 529 U.S. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261 See The Michigan Daily Staff, From the Daily: Legacy Admissions, THE MICH.
DAILY,
(June
5,
2013),
https://www.michigandaily.com/opinion/daily-legacy-a
[https://perma.cc/BP45-NQZ9].
262 See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 314–15
(2014) (holding that Court had no authority to set aside an amendment to the Michigan
Constitution prohibiting affirmative action in public education, employment, and
contracting).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 338–39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 380–81.
266 Id. at 358.
267 Id. at 332 (Breyer, J., concurring).
259
260
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race-conscious way, to erase even that minor use of affirmative action. While the
University was supposedly offending the underlying meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment in engaging in race-conscious practices, the voters were free to use
race-conscious practices to curtail that limited form of racial redress.268 The
Fourteenth Amendment became unhinged from its historical roots as a means to help
people who were recently freed from slavery, and instead became a tool of white
supremacy.
It was not enough for the Supreme Court to curtail all but the most limited use
of affirmative action in university admissions. The Court also tied the hands of local
government officials who were trying to integrate the public-school system. In
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District,269 the Supreme
Court invalidated such efforts in Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County,
Kentucky. As in Gratz, what is remarkable about these decisions is the skimpy
remedial affirmative action that was at issue.
Jefferson County had been under a court-ordered decree until 2000 to remedy
its historical system of de jure segregation.270 When the judicially ordered decree
ended, the school district wanted to take voluntary measures to maintain an
integrated school district.271 The overall statistics in the district were 66% white and
34% Black.272 Rather than try to adhere strictly to that ratio, the school district
decided to use race as a factor in admissions if enrollment would fall outside a
guideline of 15% to 50% Black.273 These guidelines only applied to students in
kindergarten or first grade, or students who were new to the school district.274
Further, after assignments were made, students could transfer between nonmagnet
schools in the district.275 Very few students were assigned based on race, given the
broad range of these criteria.276
The Seattle program had a similar minimal effect on students’ school
assignment. When determining which students would fill slots at oversubscribed
schools, the school district used a racial tiebreaker if the school was not within the
ten percentage points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite racial balance.277 The
tiebreaker rule did not affect large numbers of students, and its impact appears to
See Conor Friedersdorf, Ideas: Why California Rejected Racial Preferences, Again,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/whycalifornia-rejected-affirmative-action-again/617049/
[https://perma.cc/A6P3-MBTG]
(explaining that, like Michigan, California has also banned the use of affirmative action and
California voters voted against repealing that ban as recently as November 2020).
269 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
270 Id. at 715–716.
271 Id. at 716.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 716–17.
276 See id. at 734 (estimating that only 3% of assignments were affected by racial
guidelines).
277 Id. at 712.
268
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have affected both white and nonwhite students. More nonwhite students were
selected for one school; more white students were selected for another school; and
one school did not need to use a racial tiebreaker at all to stay within the required
range.278 The district argued that “only 52 students who were ultimately adversely
affected by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had
not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been
assigned.”279 The school district limited application of the tiebreaker to students
entering the ninth grade and did not use it for students in the higher grades.280 For
all students, the tiebreaker only affected their school choice for one year because
they could transfer to another school after one year.281 The school district had
previously experimented with a mandatory busing plan to achieve more racial
diversity but abandoned it due to parental complaints.282 Although Seattle had
voluntarily stopped using its racial tiebreaker by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, the Court nonetheless insisted on deciding the case against them.283
Given the language from prior opinions that focused on the importance of race
being used as little as possible as a decision-making factor, one might have expected
the minimal impact of these plans to have been a point in their favor. Not to Chief
Justice Roberts, who said: “While we do not suggest that greater use of race would
be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts’ racial classifications on school
enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications.”284 In case
Chief Justice Roberts’ position was unclear, he boldly proclaimed in the last
sentence of his opinion: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”285 The problem was not that Seattle or
Louisville used race too much or too little. The problem was that they used race at
all.
But, at that moment, Chief Justice Roberts did not have five votes for the claim
that all affirmative action plans were per se unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy
concurred separately to suggest that schools were free to devise “race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student
in a different fashion solely on the basis of a systemic, individual typing by race.”286
And, shortly before retiring from the Court, Kennedy found one such program—at
the University of Texas (not a K-12 school)—which met that criteria and had also
278 Id.

at 713.
Id. at 733–34.
280 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
281 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 813 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll students were free
subsequently to transfer . . . to a different school of their choice without regard to race. Thus,
at worst, a student would have to spend one year at a high school he did not pick as a first or
second choice.”).
282 Parents Involved, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
283 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 719.
284 Id. at 734.
285 Id. at 748.
286 Id. at 788–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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faithfully followed his vaunted top ten percent plan, under which the top ten percent
from every public high school was automatically admitted to a state university.287
But Kennedy’s decision in Fisher offered little guidance to a school district that
wanted to use race as a factor to integrate its kindergarten or first-grade classrooms
where students do not yet have talents and differing abilities to consider.
Although Justice Kennedy says in Parents Involved that schools, as a last resort,
may engage in a “more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student
characteristics that might include race as a component,”288 he fails to indicate how a
school district could develop such a “nuanced” program that uses race as a
component for the enrollment of five- and six-year-olds. He ignores the record in
the Seattle case where the city abandoned mandatory busing in favor of the racial
tiebreaker in response to parental complaints.289 The two lead plaintiffs’ primary
complaint in the Seattle case was the length of their bus ride, not the race of who sat
beside them on the bus or in the classroom.290
Like Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy counsels as a negative factor for
the school districts that “the number of students whose assignment depends on
express racial classifications is limited.”291 In other words, it is unconstitutional to
use race too much, as in Gratz, but also too little, as in Parents Involved. The Court
was systematically dismantling attempts to create integrated public schools
irrespective of the limited role that race played in such plans.
Let us be clear about the impossible legal standard developed in Parents
Involved. School districts are instructed to use race as little as possible, but they must
also demonstrate that the use of race was necessary to achieve significant
educational improvement for racial minorities. Not surprisingly, the empirical
literature on education suggests that aggressive use of race for school assignment,
starting in the early grades, is the best way to improve educational performance for
minority children.292 To the extent that Seattle or Jefferson County could not
demonstrate to the Court’s satisfaction that their programs were educationally
effective, it is likely because they used race too little as a factor in school
assignments. Their token use of race was not likely as a result of their conclusion
287 Fisher

v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 (2016).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
289 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp.2d 1224,
1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
290 The whole long bus ride story was also likely manufactured to generate standing.
The plaintiffs alleged they would have a four-hour bus ride as a result of the application of
the tie breaker rule and opted for private school rather than a long bus ride. The purported
long bus ride, however, occurred because they refused to list the names of any local schools
on their school choice form. Had the school district returned to its race-neutral mandatory
busing program, their bus ride might have been even longer. See Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 156 n.4 (Wash. 2003).
291 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 790.
292 See Ruth Colker, Reflections on Race: The Limits of Formal Equality, 69 OHIO
STATE L. J. 1089, 1106–1112 (2008) (examining empirical literature on effective racial
desegregation programs).
288

2022]

WHITE SUPREMACY

689

that a very minimal use of race to allocate school assignments was the best way to
improve educational performance for minority children; their token use of race was
likely the result of instructions from their lawyers that the Supreme Court was
unlikely to tolerate more than token use of race. But that legal advice proved to be
wrong in the hands of a Court that was determined to strike down any use of race to
improve the educational performance of minority children.
While joining the majority in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy was seemingly
aware of the effect that the decision would have on integration efforts at the school
board level. He says: “To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution
mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial
isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”293 Notice his choice of
word; he asks whether the Constitution mandates acceptance of the segregated status
quo. He interprets Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion as taking that position.
But even if Justice Kennedy’s position remained the view of the Court, what
does that mean for affirmative action? Kennedy never found a K-12 plan that met
his stringent criteria. As for higher education, the one program that passed muster
was from the University of Texas. After two trips to the Supreme Court, Justice
Kennedy managed to author a 5-4 majority opinion in Fisher v. University of
Texas294 that upheld the University’s incredibly narrow use of race as a plus factor
for about 25% of the applicant pool.295
Fisher is an extraordinarily narrow victory for race-affirmative admissions.
Close examination of the facts can help underscore the ways in which the Texas
race-affirmative admissions process could not be replicated elsewhere. In 1996, the
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas296 had invalidated the admissions process at the
University of Texas, holding that any consideration of race violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the Texas legislature
adopted the “Top Ten Percent Law” in 1998.297 Under that law, the university would
first admit the top ten percent of students graduating from public Texas high schools
and then admit the rest of the class through various race-neutral methods.298 In the
last year that the university admitted students under this program, without an
additional race-affirmative measure, it admitted an incoming class that was 4.5%
African-American, 17.9% Asian-American, and 16.9% Latino-American.299
Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that was inconsistent
with Hopwood. In Grutter v. Bollinger,300 the Supreme Court ruled that race could

293 Parents

Involved, 551 U.S. at 788.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 (2016).
295 Id. at 2206.
296 Hopwood v. State of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
297 Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
298 Id. at 2205.
299 Id. at 2218 (Alito, J., dissenting).
300 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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be a factor under a system of holistic review of an application.301 But, the Court also
made it clear in the companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger302 that a university could
not award predetermined points to the applications of minority students.303
The Grutter opinion offered Texas an opportunity to continue to take steps to
diversify its admissions process while also seeking to admit the most highly
qualified candidates. The Top Ten Percent Plan had succeeded in maintaining some
racial diversity during the admissions process. Further expansion of that plan to, let’s
say, the top fifteen percent, would likely have increased diversity even more. But
the problem with using class rank as the exclusive criteria for admissions is that it
disadvantages students who attend highly competitive high schools. While a top
fifteen percent plan might increase diversity, it might not result in offers of
admission to the most highly qualified racial minorities (or white students). Those
students might be attending rigorous academic programs where they fall outside the
top ten or fifteen percent by class rank.
In fact, the university concluded that it wanted to cap the number of students
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan to 75% of the student body so that it could
use the other seats for students with possibly higher academic credentials than those
selected under the Top Ten Percent Plan.304 In other words, it decided to admit fewer
than the top ten percent of each high school class in order to try to strengthen the
quality of the admitted class.
The dilemma for the university was: how could it use merit to select the
remaining 25% of the class without undoing the diversity work that was attained
through the Top Ten Percent Plan? With Latino students, for example, sitting at
16.9% of the admitted students under the Ten Percent Plan, that number could
plummet to 12 or 13% if the remaining seats were filled nearly exclusively with
white applicants.305 So, closely following Grutter, the university designed a
complicated system where race would be a factor of a factor in determining a
student’s ability to be admitted.306 The university never documented the impact that

301 Id. at 337 (describing law school as engaging in a “holistic review of each applicant’s

file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse
educational environment”).
302 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
303 Id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“But the selection index, by setting up
automatic, predetermined point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the diversity
contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed.”).
304 Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
305 If the university were to primarily rely on test scores to select the remaining
candidates, that kind of impact is plausible. See William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror
or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally
Achieving ‘Elite’ College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1062–66 (2001) (discussing
adverse impact of standardized testing); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market LockIn Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 762 (2000).
306 See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
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race had in this process for a mere 25% of the applicant pool,307 but it could not have
been very significant. Nonetheless, it did allow the university to admit qualified
minorities who barely missed admission under the Top Ten Percent Plan.
The University of Texas could achieve some racial diversity through the
combination of the Top Ten Percent Plan and the modest use of racial affirmative
action, because Texas public schools are so highly segregated, and Texas principally
draws from its own state’s population in admitting students.308 The Fisher case has
little precedential value, because few other states are willing to devote a substantial
number of seats in their entering class to students based purely on high school class
rank. Universities arguably prefer Michigan’s approach under which they get to
consider all candidates so they can admit the most highly qualified candidates from
all racial groups. The Texas plan may create perverse incentives for students to stay
enrolled in less academically rigorous public schools where they think they might
excel, rather than seeking opportunities at the most academically competitive public
schools. The fact that few states have chosen an admission policy akin to the Texas
plan suggests that it just isn’t a great way to select an entering class. The pretense of
racial neutrality (while importing the consequences of housing racial segregation)
overwhelms the desire to admit the most highly qualified students. The important
point is that the so-called victory for affirmative action in Fisher was not much of a
victory at all. It allowed a state to continue to use a much-criticized Top Ten Percent
Plan,309 which achieved diversity by building on the consequences of housing
discrimination along with a very modest race-conscious step for 25% of the
applicant pool. The winner was not affirmative action. The winner was a creative,
largely race-neutral work-around written for a Court that was otherwise determined
to end all race-conscious affirmative action.
The departures of Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg from the Court results in little
doubt that universities and school districts, which could previously try to thread an
extremely small needle to use race as a factor, no longer have any available needle
at all. They can take advantage of housing segregation to achieve an integrated
Allyson Waller, Federal Judge Tosses Lawsuit that Sought to End UT-Austin’s
Affirmative Action Policy, TEX. TRIB. (Jul. 27, 2021, 11:00 AM) https://www.texastribune.
org/2021/07/27/ut-austin-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/UED4-R9Y8] (explaining
that the University of Texas admits 25% “of it of its students through a holistic review in
which race is considered a factor, which has been university practice since 2003”).
308 See Jennifer Mason McAward, Good Faith and Narrow Tailoring in Fisher v.
University of Texas, 59 LOY. L. REV. 77, 86 (2013) (“Texas’s Top Ten Percent law has been
relatively successful in creating racial diversity because Texas’s public high schools are
severely segregated by race.”).
309 See Lindsay Daugherty, Isaac McFarlin & Paco Martorell, The Texas Ten Percent
Plan’s Impact on College Enrollment, 14 EDUC. NEXT (Apr. 22, 2014),
https://www.educationnext.org/texas-ten-percent-plans-impact-college-enrollment/ [https://
perma.cc/GY28-YCCX] (“Some critics allege that they force the most-selective public
colleges to admit underprepared students from low-performing schools and to deny
admission to better prepared students; others complain that they don’t do enough to promote
diversity.”).
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classroom by admitting the top ten percent of each public high school class to their
flagship university. But no such mechanism is likely to exist to integrate their K-12
classrooms. Further, property taxes will be able to continue to ensure that the rich
have access to better funded schools that are also likely to attain better educational
outcomes for students.310 Brown’s aspiration to integrate U.S. schools has been
squelched. The Fourteenth Amendment is merely a tool to curtail meaningful
attempts at racial integration. White supremacy has won.
D. The Dismantling of Democracy
Conservatives often promote judicial restraint as the proper role of the Court.311
Under that view, one might applaud the Warren Court’s narrow remedial path in
enforcing Brown. One might argue that the Court did all it could in announcing that
school desegregation was unconstitutional, and it was up to legislatures and school
boards to implement the remedies necessary to achieve those results.
But, if one takes the restraintist position, then it is hard to explain why the
Supreme Court has been so involved in second-guessing decisions by state and local
government to dismantle racial segregation in K-12 and higher education. A genuine
conservative restraintist should have said that Jefferson County, Seattle, and the
states of Michigan and Texas were in the best positions to determine how to end
racial inequality in education. Thus, it is important to recognize that the cases
discussed in Section II.B resulted in attempts by state and local government to take
race-positive steps to help overcome a legacy of white supremacy.
In response, restraintists might say that they could not permit those state and
local branches of government to institute race-conscious programs because such
action goes against what they understand to be the very core of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause—the rejection of any kind of racial
distinctions. Although they may favor restraintism as a theoretical matter, they could
not apply it to cases contesting state action in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. In James Bradley Thayer’s words, a court
“can only disregard the Act, when those who have the right to make laws have not
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, -- so clear that it is not open

310 See

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding that use
of property taxes to fund public schools did not require the use of strict scrutiny by the courts;
the system was found to be constitutional under rational basis scrutiny). Empirical studies
have concluded that student achievement depends significantly on teacher achievement,
teacher experience, and class size. See Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education:
New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. L. ON LEGIS. 465, 488 (1991);
see also Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 140 (Ala. 1993) (stating that the Alabama
Supreme Court relied on Ferguson’s work to conclude that there is a positive correlation
between student achievement levels and certain types of expenditures).
311 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 76–78 (1962).
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to rational question.”312 If, like Justice Thomas, one believes that the Equal
Protection Clause mandates a strict no-racial distinction construction,313 then one
might feel justified in second-guessing the state and local government judgments for
how best to move towards racial equity in education.
But that view of the core meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment declaring “No state shall . . .” does not apply to Congress. Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment increases the scope of Congress’ power by giving it
the power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment.314 If one views Congress as a
co-equal branch of government with the federal courts, then one would imagine that
a restraintist jurist would be unlikely to dismantle any statutes that Congress enacted
pursuant to its Section Five authority. And a similar argument would be made
concerning legislation to enforce the Thirteenth315 and Fifteenth Amendments316
because they also provide Congress with enforcement authority. In fact, one could
even argue that these enforcement powers are the clearest indication of an
abolitionist perspective in the Constitution—the ratifiers of these Civil War
Amendments empowered Congress to end racial apartheid. And the
Reconstructionist Congress initially took up that mantle by enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1870, 1871, and 1875.317 These laws broadly tried to end racial apartheid in
both the public and private sector by enforcing the Civil Rights Amendments,
especially against state recalcitrance.
Initially, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted Congress’s enforcement
authority. In 1879, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 could be constitutionally construed to permit a prosecution of a
state court judge for keeping Black people off of juries.318 J.D. Coles, a state court
judge, was arrested under the 1875 Act for keeping certain citizens of “African race
and black color” off of juries.319 Coles sought a writ of habeas corpus to be released
from custody. The state of Virginia joined him in this request.320
In some ways, Coles’ case was an easy one. The Supreme Court had held in an
earlier case the same term that a statute that excluded any but “white persons” from
312 James

B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
313 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (explaining the personal belief “that there is a moral [and] constitutional
equivalence between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on
the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality. . . . In each instance, it is
racial discrimination, plain and simple” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
314 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
315 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”).
316 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.”).
317 See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 1875.
318 Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
319 Id. at 340.
320 Id. at 340–41.
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juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment.321 Thus, it was easy to conclude that
Congress could ban state action that also served to exclude Black people from juries
through its Section Five enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nonetheless, in upholding Congress’s power to enact the 1875 law, the
Supreme Court articulated a broad understanding of Congress’s Section Five
authority. In abolitionist language, it said:
One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the colored race from
that condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had
previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons
within the jurisdiction of the States. They were intended to take away all
possibility of oppression by law because of race or color. They were
intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States
and enlargements of the power of Congress . . . Indeed, every addition of
power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of
the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.322
That understanding of the breadth of Congress’s powers, however, was shortlived. In 1883, with a strong dissent by Justice Harlan, the Court invalidated much
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as exceeding Congress’s Section Five authority.323
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude.324
The Supreme Court overturned this provision as failing to comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement.325 In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Harlan argued that the statute should be understood as coming within Congress’s
Section Two authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.326 After first reciting case
law instructing the Supreme Court to have a restraintist understanding of Congress’s
321 Strauder

v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. at 344–45.
323 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 32 (1883) (“[N]o countenance of authority
for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its passage being
suggested. . . .”).
324 Id. at 9 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1875).
325 Id. at 11 (“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”).
326 Id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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authority, Harlan said that one should understand the Thirteenth Amendment as
giving Congress authority to:
remove certain burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery,
and to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to
previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil
freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .327
With respect to the state action argument favored by the majority opinion,
Harlan responded: “Such legislation must act upon persons, not upon the abstract
thing denominated a state, but upon the persons who are the agents of the State, in
the denial of the rights which were intended to be secured.”328
Although Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson later served as the
foundation to the majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, no such dynamic
has occurred with respect to Harlan’s interpretation of Congressional action under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.329 The state action doctrine is alive and
well, and Congress’s enforcement power under the Civil War Amendments has been
subjected to repeated constrictions over the years. It should be no surprise that an
institution that was willing to render the Dred Scott decision330 a few decades earlier
would also use every available tool to undermine Congress’s enforcement powers
under the Civil War Amendments. Amending the Constitution does not necessarily
curtail or even lessen the power of white supremacy.
The 1997 case that severely curtailed Congress’s power to use the Civil War
Amendments to enforce the Equal Protection Clause was a seemingly unrelated case
in which the Court concluded that Congress exceeded its authority when it adopted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in City of Boerne v. Flores.331
At first glance, City of Boerne is an unlikely case to constrict Congress’s power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court was
joined by Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice Scalia concurred
separately. The dissenting Justices—O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer—disagreed
about the majority’s interpretation of the First Amendment but did not
fundamentally disagree with the majority’s analysis of Congress’s authority, under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact enabling legislation.
The City of Boerne case concerned a request for a building permit from the
Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio. The request was subject to special rules that
327 Id.
328 Id.

at 58.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (stating that the Court’s
decision gave a glimmer of hope that the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enabling Clause would
empower Congress to invalidate private discrimination—but that decision has not been used
subsequently as a justification for Congressional power).
330 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
331 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
329
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applied to historic districts.332 The city’s Historic Landmark Commission denied the
request.333 Relying on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), the
Archbishop argued that he should not be subjected to the rules governing historic
districts. He argued that the permit denial impacted the ability of the church to hold
services for its parishioners; about 40 to 60 parishioners could not be accommodated
at Sunday masses due to the small size of the church.334 Under RFRA, the
government would have to remove this burden to the exercise of religion unless it
could demonstrate it had a compelling state interest in applying the historic district
rules to the church.335
The issue in City of Boerne was the constitutionality of RFRA. Could Congress
use its Section 5 authority to impose the compelling state interest test on local
government when private parties argued that the neutral law interfered with their
ability to engage in the free exercise of religion? In 1990, in Employment Division
v. Smith,336 the Supreme Court had ruled that “neutral, generally applicable laws
may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling
governmental interest.”337 Nonetheless, purporting to use its Section Five authority,
Congress enacted RFRA to prohibit government from substantially burdening a
person’s exercise of religion through neutral, generally applicable laws unless the
government can demonstrate that the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest.”338 In other words, Congress sought to use its Section Five
authority to overturn Smith. Under Marbury v. Madison,339 it is axiomatic that
Congress cannot use its powers to alter the meaning of the Constitution.340
But City of Boerne was actually a more difficult case than one in which
Congress brazenly and unconstitutionally tried to overturn an unpopular Supreme
Court decision. The challenge for the Court’s majority was to reconcile the holding
in City of Boerne with some prior decisions about Congress’s power to use Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment
to ban racial discrimination by state actors.
The hardest case to reconcile with the opinion in City of Boerne was the 1966
decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan.341 The issue in Katzenbach was the
constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided
that no person who had successfully completed sixth grade in Puerto Rico could be
denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English.342 That
provision arguably sought to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter v.
332 Id.

at 512.
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Id. at 515–16.
U.S. 872 (1990).
337 521 U.S. at 514.
338 Id. at 515 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1).
339 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
340 521 U.S. at 529.
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Northampton County Board of Elections,343 in which the Court upheld the facial
constitutionality of a North Carolina literacy test under the Fourteenth
Amendment.344 Despite the decision in Lassiter, the Supreme Court upheld Section
4(e) in Morgan because it was consistent with the “letter and spirit of the
constitution.”345
The dissenters in Morgan argued that the decision was dangerous because it
could allow Congress to dilute the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by, for
example, using its Section Five enforcement authority to establish a racially
segregated system of education.346 The majority responded with a one-way ratchet
understanding of Congress’ Section Five enforcement authority: Congress may
expand the range of conduct prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment but may not
“restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”347 That language in Morgan could be
interpreted to give Congress expansive authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Boerne took a sledgehammer to
an expansive reading of Congress’s Section Five authority as articulated in Morgan.
While noting that there was language in Morgan that could be interpreted “as
acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights
contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Court concluded that that is
“not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one.”348 In the Court’s
opinion, that kind of power would be counter to Marbury v. Madison.349
City of Boerne is a difficult decision to understand because the decision was a
product of both liberal and conservative understandings of Congress’s powers. On
the one hand, the Court wanted to appease the Court’s liberals by upholding prior
decisions like Morgan that affirmed Congress’s power to enact legislation to protect
racial minorities from discrimination. On the other hand, the Court wanted to prevent
Congress from using its legislative powers to overturn constitutional law decisions
with which it disagreed; the conservatives wanted to end Congress’s broad authority
under Morgan’s one-way ratchet theory. To reach this position, the Court created a
congruence and proportionality test. “While preventive rules are sometimes
appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved.”350 In other words, when Congress seeks to use its
Section Five enforcement authority, it is not confined to merely listing that conduct
which the courts have already construed as unconstitutional. Congress may also, as
the Court permitted in Morgan, adopt remedial measures that seek to prevent
possible unconstitutional conduct in the future. Thus, we should understand Morgan
as standing for the principle that it is alright for Congress to ban a particular type of
343 360

U.S. 45 (1959).
Id. at 53–54.
345 384 U.S. at 651 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
346 Id. at 667–68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
347 Id. at 651 n.10.
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voting qualification that has a long history as a “notorious means to deny and abridge
voting rights on racial grounds”351 even if there is no direct evidence of such
nefarious conduct in New York, where the rule was directed. By contrast, the Court
concluded that Congress did not have evidence of that kind of notorious conduct
when it enacted the RFRA.352
Because the City of Boerne Court went out of its way to reaffirm various cases
concerning the scope of Congress’s authority to enforce the Civil Rights Act of
1965, it was not clear how this new congruence and proportionality test would apply.
Was the Court’s holding that Congress had exceeded its authority confined to RFRA
or might it extend to other civil rights laws?
The immediate impact of City of Boerne was for the Court to strike down civil
rights laws that applied outside the area of race discrimination. In Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents,353 the Court held in 2000 that Congress could not use its Section
Five authority to protect state employees under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.354 Congress also could not use its Section Five authority to protect
women under the Violence Against Women Act.355 Then, a year later, the Court held
that Congress could not use its Section Five authority to protect state employees
from employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act.356
Finally, in a confusing duo of decisions, the Court upheld the family leave provisions
under the Family and Medical Leave Act, as being within Congress’s prophylactic
authority to prevent gender-based discrimination,357 but overturned the provision
that allowed employees to take leave when they became seriously ill, even though
those provisions were important to women who faced pregnancy-related illnesses.358
These cases suggested that the Court was willing to be activist to conclude that
Congress had exceeded its Section Five authority but was hesitant to overturn key
elements of the Civil Rights Acts. But that understanding of City of Boerne is
beginning to unravel. In Shelby County v. Holder,359 a case in which the Court
mysteriously never mentioned Congress’s Section Five authority, the Court was
willing to invalidate the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.360 Reminiscent of the Court chastising Congress in Boerne for only
considering examples of religious discrimination that were more than forty years old
when it enacted RFRA, the Court chastised Congress for using a preclearance

351 Id. at 533 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 355 (1966) (Black,
J., concurring and dissenting)).
352 Id. at 530 (“The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings
mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years.”).
353 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
354 Id. at 92.
355 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
356 Bd. Trs. Univ. Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
357 Nev. Dep’t Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
358 Coleman v. Ct. App. Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
359 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
360 Id. at 557.
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formula that was based on forty-year-old facts.361 That language was also similar to
Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion in which she suggested that affirmative action
should be able to end in 25 years.362 Rather than understand white supremacy to be
an imbedded feature of American society, the Court repeatedly considers it to be a
soon-to-be bygone era in American history.
The Court has so far considered key aspects of the Civil Rights Acts to be sacred
cows, but the modern Court’s narrow understanding of Congressional power makes
it virtually impossible to broaden those laws in response to renewed concerns about
racial civil rights in the post-George Floyd moment. In fact, the Court’s race
jurisprudence is increasingly irreconcilable with its general constriction of
Congressional power. We should just hold our breath until the Court recognizes that
fact. “I can’t breathe” should be the metaphor while we wait for the Court to further
constrain Congress’s authority to combat the legacy of white supremacy.
E. Proof of Race Discrimination Made Nearly Impossible for Black Plaintiffs
While the Supreme Court has bent over backwards to hear cases from white
plaintiffs complaining that they were victims of race discrimination when they could
not be admitted to a particular grade school or college because of the subtle way race
was a factor in a small part of the admissions process, the Court has essentially
thrown Black plaintiffs out of Court when they have tried to contest the ways in
which race discrimination operates in their lives under state sanction. It did not have
to be that way.
Soon after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court
understood that race or national origin discrimination could occur without direct de
jure acts of discrimination. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,363 the Court held that the city of
San Francisco had violated the Equal Protection Clause when it adversely enforced
against Chinese-American people an ordinance governing the operation of laundries.
The Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.364
Yick Wo was followed by other cases in which courts suggested that evil
motives could be enough to overturn state action under the Fourteenth Amendment
361 Id.

at 554.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now,
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without direct evidence of racial discrimination. In 1960, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,365 the Court invalidated a local ordinance that altered the shape of
Tuskegee “from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,”366 which had the
effect of removing all but four or five of the city’s 400 Black residents from its
jurisdiction. Similarly, in 1964, the Court held that a county’s closing of the public
schools while contributing to the support of the private segregated white schools
denied Black children the equal protection of the law.367
But the tide soon turned against challenges to state actions that had a disparate
impact against Black residents. In 1971, the Supreme Court in Palmer v.
Thompson368 upheld the decision by Jackson, Mississippi to close its five public
swimming pools in order to avoid racial integration. While recognizing that “there
is language in some of our cases interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments which may suggest that the motive or purpose behind a law is relevant
to its constitutionality,”369 the Court held that that language could not be used to
invalidate a governmental action that applied to both its white and Black residents.
Further, continuing a narrow interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court
said it did not have authority to construe the state action as perpetuating an
unconstitutional “badge or incident of slavery.”370 Not anticipating the Court’s
subsequent decision in City of Boerne, the Palmer Court threw a bone to the
Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause when it noted that Congress could act
to overturn such state action.371
This language from Palmer can only seem quaint today as a plausible
understanding of Congress’s authority to enforce the Civil Rights Amendments:
[A]lthough the Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy collection of words to
allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the operation of
swimming pools throughout the length and breadth of this Nation, the
Amendment does contain other words that we held in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. could empower Congress to outlaw “badges of slavery.” . . .
But Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate a city’s
opening or closing of swimming pools or other recreational facilities.372
In other words, when the Supreme Court narrowed its understanding of its authority
to invalidate state action under the Civil Rights Amendments, it clearly did not
intend to limit Congress’s power to enforce those amendments. It did not intend to
limit Congress’s authority to outlaw “badges of slavery.”
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In 1976, the Supreme Court continued to narrow its authority to overturn state
action that adversely impacted Black plaintiffs. In Washington v. Davis,373 it held
that a plaintiff could not succeed on an equal protection claim solely with evidence
of disparate impact; the plaintiff also needed evidence of discriminatory purpose.374
Because Yick Wo was arguably a case in which plaintiffs succeeded through proof
of discriminatory impact alone, the Court had to contend with whether it was
overruling Yick Wo. The answer was no. It reconceptualized Yick Wo as a case where
the evidence of discriminatory purpose could be gleaned from the overwhelming
disparate impact. The Court said: “Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it
is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.”375 In Davis, disproportionate impact was not sufficient evidence of an
unconstitutional purpose because of evidence that the city had taken other steps to
integrate its police force.376
Two subsequent cases, however, made it clear that Yick Wo stands by itself as
a case where disproportionate impact alone can trigger a finding of an equal
protection violation. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.377 and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,378 the Court again walked back
when, if ever, disproportionate impact alone could invoke an equal protection
violation.
Arlington Heights was an important lawsuit from the perspective of ending the
legacy of white supremacy. The Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, a
nonprofit developer, had sought to purchase a tract of land to build racially
integrated low- and moderate-income housing.379 Because housing patterns are tied
to school assignments, integrated housing is an important tool to attain school
desegregation. To build this integrated housing, the developer needed the Village of
Arlington Heights to rule favorably on its rezoning request. When this request was
denied, the developer challenged the denial as an equal protection violation.380 Their
disproportionate impact theory, which was accepted by the Seventh Circuit, was that
40% of Chicago area residents would be eligible to become tenants of this new
development, although those potential tenants composed a far lower percentage of
the total area population.381 Further, the plaintiffs offered evidence that the Village
applied a buffer policy more harshly in this instance than in previous instances,
suggesting an improper racial motive for their conduct.382 Finally, the plaintiffs
proceeded in this case without the benefit of the Court’s decision in Davis. Based on
cases like Yick Wo and Gomillion, the plaintiffs thought that the Village’s refusal to
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 252.
375 Id. at 242.
376 Id. at 246.
377 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
378 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–81 (1979).
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rezone, with its racially discriminatory effect, was sufficient to demonstrate
unconstitutionality.383
The Supreme Court not only tightened the rules under Davis, but also did not
allow the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights to re-argue that case in the lower courts
with the benefit of these new rules. Again, the Court narrowed the disproportionate
impact route that seemed to be permissible under Yick Wo when it said:
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face . . . . The evidentiary inquiry is then
relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in
Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court
must look to other evidence.384
In dissent, Justice White criticized the Court for announcing a new standard,
that neither the plaintiff nor court of appeals was aware of, and then failing to remand
the case back to the court of appeals for consideration in light of its decision.385 The
Court, however, was eager to shut the doors of disproportionate impact claims and
found no reason to remand for further factual development of the record.
If one wondered whether the Yick Wo disproportionate impact theory was dead,
the Court answered that question in Feeney.386 While a sex discrimination case, the
Court followed the Davis line of cases in determining whether plaintiff established
an Equal Protection violation through an argument about disproportionate impact.
In this case, the effect of the state’s veterans preference statute was to negatively
impact women in the state’s labor force, of whom only 1.8% could benefit from the
veterans preference. These statistics were arguably as stark as those in Yick Wo and
Gomillion. Yet, the Court insisted that the “legitimate noninvidious purpose”387 of
the law could not be missed—preferring veterans over nonveterans. It rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that an entity should be responsible for the natural and
foreseeable consequences of its actions.388 Although the state’s veterans preference
harmed women’s employment opportunities “as inevitable as the proposition that if
tails is up, heads must be down,”389 it was not unconstitutional. Discriminatory
purpose, we are told, “implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences.”390
The fact that the Court’s discriminatory intent jurisprudence does not take into
account modern understandings of the way implicit bias works to further racial
383 Id.
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stereotyping is well-accepted in most progressive quarters.391 There is no need for
me to repeat those arguments. I would like to make a different point—that we should
look at the parallel, aggressive development of case law on behalf of white plaintiffs
who challenge affirmative action along with the aggressive curtailment of equal
protection arguments for Black plaintiffs. These two developments take place
simultaneously in the service of white supremacy under the U.S. Constitution.
Let’s put these two case developments side by side. The Supreme Court went
out of its way to hear a complaint by Allan Bakke, a white man, that he was not
admitted to medical school because of affirmative treatment that was provided to
various racial minorities. But Bakke was rejected from twelve medical schools, and
his age, not his race, was likely the factor that caused him to be rejected from these
schools.392 Further, his score of 468 of 500 points was below the threshold for
automatic admission at U.C. Davis medical school.393 But Bakke, at least, did
eventually attend U.C. Davis Medical School, so his case was about a genuine desire
to attend that school and become a doctor. By contrast, Abigail Fisher, a white
woman, was the plaintiff for more than a decade in the Texas affirmative action case.
Texas university official, Greg Vincent, noted that 168 African-American or Latino
students, with higher grades than Fisher, were denied admission.394 To allow Fisher
to continue her case, after having already completed college, the Court had to
construe her injury as one involving a right to be considered for all admission spots,
even if such consideration would lead to a denial of admissions.
More fundamentally, a Court that has been hostile to affirmative action hides
behind its ignorance of the myriad of ways that white privilege advantages white
applicants to these various universities. Abigail Fisher was able to get in touch with
Edward Blum, the lawyer who would handle her case, the day she received her
rejection letter.395 Blum was reportedly a friend of her father.396 After attending
Louisiana State University, Fisher obtained a job in finance.397 It is easy to imagine
that white privilege likely assisted her in subtle and overt ways throughout her life.
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 356–58 (1987) (drawing on cognitive
psychology to argue that the Court’s requirement to find conscious or intentional motivation
disregards the effect that the history of racism has had on the individual and collective
unconscious); Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp & Sara Jackson, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount
a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1198–99 (2008)
(updating Lawrence’s theory to reflect social cognition theory).
392 Cf. Kekaplan, Allan Bakke: The Applicant and Plaintiff, THE CIV. RTS. MOVEMENT
(Feb. 18, 2015), https://civilrightsmovement.blogs.wm.edu/2015/02/18/allan-bakke-theapplicant/ [https://perma.cc/U6YE-QSJ8].
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Yet, she was entitled to challenge the subtle use of race by the University of Texas
in an admissions process aimed at helping the University to admit the most qualified
class that was also somewhat racially diverse.
By contrast, when Black applicants who applied to the police force, or a
nonprofit committed to building integrated housing went before the Court, they met
staunch skepticism. It was unthinkable to the Court that unconscious racism or
implicit bias could skew the D.C. police department’s choice of test or that the
Village of Arlington’s zoning authority could be influenced by negative stereotypes
about integrated housing.
F. The Puzzle Pieces
Putting the puzzle pieces together, this is what has occurred:
•
Brown’s legacy is that state and local government may not engage in racebased affirmative action other than in the narrowest of circumstances.
•
If a state does choose to engage in limited race-based affirmative action,
voters may overturn that decision through the initiative process.
•
If Congress tries to create additional race-based remedies, so that plaintiffs
no longer need to rely on constitutional law to dismantle white supremacy,
those efforts are likely to be found unconstitutional.
•
If a Black plaintiff wants to sue directly under the Fourteenth Amendment,
they are unlikely to have a viable case unless they can provide direct
evidence of de jure discrimination.
I can imagine a reader responding that this critique is unfair. One might argue
that these results can be understood as supporting a federalist vision for society or
promoting democracy. My reply is “hogwash.” If the vision is federalism, then states
should have the ability to enact affirmative action measures. If the vision is
democracy, then Congress should be able to strengthen federal law in the name of
racial equality. But if the vision is white supremacy, then we have seen total
vindication.
III. WHITE POWER
In this last section of the Article, I am going to switch from the impersonal third
person to a more personal perspective.
As a privileged white person, I have grown increasingly uncomfortable
teaching the required law school class on the U.S. Constitution. I suspect that many
students enter my classroom expecting me to expound on the beauty and wisdom of
this foundational document. I have to worry that I contribute to white supremacy by
furthering that premise. In the language of my colleague Amna Akbar,398 how can I
398 Amna

Akbar details three criteria that we can use to assess whether a reform is what
she calls a “non-reform reform” – a truly transformative reform that is likely to be sustained
during the onslaught of racist ideology. See Akbar, supra note 13. Non-reform reforms meet
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teach constitutional law in a way that encourages my students to think broadly and
creatively about non-reform reforms?
This Article reflects how I have come to re-understand my role in the classroom
when I teach constitutional law. I understand the Constitution as having two critical
roles related to the current abolitionist struggle. First, the Constitution is unlikely to
be a positive, affirmative tool to dismantle white supremacy. But, as Daniel Farbman
has effectively argued, we can still understand today’s civil rights lawyers as part of
what he calls “resistance lawyering.”399 These lawyers can use their losses under the
Voting Rights Act,400 for example, as evidence of the need for deep-seeded structural
changes in our system of voting.401 One could argue that such losses helped mobilize
the effective grass-roots voting rights work that Stacey Abrams has led in Georgia402
while also emboldening the political right to pass highly restrictive voting rights
laws in Georgia.403 Civil rights lawyers may unsuccessfully seek to overturn
Georgia’s new voting rights law, but their efforts may heighten the public critique
(which has even been joined by some of corporate America)404 of Georgia’s effort
to suppress Black voters.405 It is remarkable and a sign of changing public sentiment
that President Biden was willing to describe the new Georgia law as “‘outrageous,’
‘un-American’ and ‘Jim Crow in the 21st Century’” and say we have a “‘moral and

three criteria: (1) They “advance a radical critique and radical imagination. Reform is not the
end goal; transformation is.” Id. at 103. (2) They “draw from and create pathways for
building ever-growing organized popular power. They aim to shift power away from elites
and toward the masses of people.” Id. at 105. (3) They “are about the dialectic between
radical ideation and power building. . . . They aim to create ‘a vast extension of democratic
participation in all areas of civic life—amounting to a very considerable transformation of
the character of the state and of existing bourgeois democratic forms.’” Id. at 106.
399 See Farbman, supra note 8.
400 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding that the Voting Rights
Act provision setting forth coverage formula was unconstitutional).
401 See Ed Kilgore, The John Lewis Voting Rights Act Picks Up Steam, INTELLIGENCER
(Apr. 22, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/04/the-john-lewis-voting-rights-actpicks-up-steam.html [https://perma.cc/G5PN-GP6H] (discussing H.R. 1/S. 1, the For the
People Act and the John Lewis Voting Rights Act).
402 For a general discussion of Stacey Abrams’ work, see Reid J. Epstein & Astead W.
Herndon, The 10-year Stacey Abrams Project to Flip Georgia Has Come to Fruition, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/stacey-abramsgeorgia.html [https://perma.cc/7WSA-9AZ2].
403 See Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, What Georgia’s Voting Law Really Does,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/02/us/politics/georgiavoting-law-annotated.html [https://perma.cc/DK4C-RG77].
404 See id.
405 Stephen Fowler, DOJ Says Georgia’s New Voting Law Restricts The Black Vote,
NPR (June 26, 2021 5:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/26/1010606306/doj-saysgeorgias-new-voting-law-restricts-the-black-vote [https://perma.cc/7EJA-YF3J] (“The DOJ
says the discriminatory effect of Georgia’s law, particularly on Black voters, was known to
Republican lawmakers who nonetheless pushed for its passage.”).
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constitutional obligation to act.’”406 Change rarely moves in a straight line; the story
of Constitutional law can be a story of change, resistance to change, backlash, and
continued struggle. Even if the courts will not use their authority to overturn the
Georgia law, the public discourse about what a constitution can mean is influenced
by this kind of public discussion.
Secondly, and possibly even more unfortunately, the U.S. Constitution should
be understood as an impediment to non-reform reforms, be they small or large. Let
me first offer one small example. President-elect Biden announced that he would
prioritize Covid financial relief to minority-owned businesses.407 Putting aside the
logistical hurdle of whether he could get such a relief package through a Congress
which is weighted towards representation of the deep south, the proposed relief faced
immediate criticism as a kind of discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Brit
Hume described Biden’s plans as “racial discrimination, plain and simple.”408
Kimberly Klacik declared: “This is actual discrimination. The opposite of what my
hero, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., fought & died for in America.”409 Jeremy Frankel
said: “This seems like a blatant violation of the civil rights act, if not the fourteenth
amendment.”410
And, unfortunately, as far as constitutionality is concerned, these critics were
right. As discussed in Part II, Congress does not have the authority to target relief at
minority communities, because that would be considered a violation of the
Constitution’s rigid formal equality principles.
The Constitution is also likely to serve as an impediment to broader, more
meaningful reform. For example, the House of Representatives boldly introduced
the “For the People Act” or H.R. 1 on January 3, 2021.411 The bill requires states to
re-enfranchise all people convicted of felonies who are not currently serving time in
a correctional institution, creates a public financing program for congressional
candidates, bans challenges to voters’ eligibility by non-elected officials, mandates
a federal voting holiday, prohibits deceptive practices and voter intimidation,
combats voter purging, creates new ethics rules for the Supreme Court, and requires
candidates for president and vice president to publicly disclose their tax returns.412
406 See

Jane C. Timm, ‘Outrageous’: Biden Condemns New Georgia Law as a ‘Blatant
Attack’ on Voting Rights, NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
elections/democrats-excoriate-new-voting-restrictions-georgia-make-it-illegal-give-n1262
181 [https://perma.cc/2J54-2JZ5].
407 Ellie Bufkin, Biden Faces Backlash over Vow to Prioritize Minority-Owned
Businesses, ABC: 7 ON YOUR SIDE (Jan. 12, 2021), https://katv.com/news/nationworld/biden-faces-backlash-over-vow-to-prioritize-minority-owned-businesses [https://per
ma.cc/5SND-W5Y9].
408 Id.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 See For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021)
https://democracyreform-sarbanes.house.gov/sites/democracyreform.house.gov/files/BILLTEXT_H.R.-1-Introduction_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3V6-2UTB].
412 Id.
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Even if such a bill can muster the required 60 votes in the Senate to overcome a
filibuster, it is likely to face constitutional challenge by conservatives who think
states should have unlimited power to set qualifications for voters.
It is important for students of constitutional law to realize how likely it is that
the most progressive legislation will be ruled unconstitutional by the courts. But the
more important question is what do we learn from that fact?
Some, like voting rights scholar Richard Hasen, argue that progressives should
favor a narrower voting rights law that is likely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.413 The key elements of such a bill are restoring “the preclearance provision”
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, “requir[ing] that states offer ample registration and
voting opportunities to voters,” “requir[ing] states to assure election security,” and
“end[ing] partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts by requiring states to
use bipartisan or nonpartisan commissions to draw the lines.”414
But others, like the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,415
joined by 200 national organizations, continue to push for the passage of H.R. 1.
Taking a page from the history of resistance lawyering, they are not limiting their
vision for change to what is readily possible or even constitutional. They recognize
the importance of pushing for non-reform reforms even as the political calculation
will, at most, permit incremental reform. Notice, for example, that Hasen’s list of
passable reforms includes increased “election security”—a concession to
conservatives who have falsely pushed claims of election fraud.416 Of course, that
concession is understandable in a political atmosphere in which white supremacy
amasses great power. What is politically possible is unlikely to be a non-reform
reform, even if the courts were not a roadblock to implementation of bold measures
to overturn white supremacy.
The important point, I would argue, is that we provide our students with as
many tools as possible. They should learn how current constitutional doctrine makes
it difficult to use the courts to challenge state action that subordinates and
discriminates against Black people. They should also learn how progressive reforms,
if they can be passed at the local, state, or national level, are likely to be overturned
by the courts. They can then decide if they want to work on narrow reforms, like
those proposed by Hasen, which might pass constitutional muster, or whether they
want to work on broader reforms like H.R. 1, which face an uncertain political and
constitutional future.

See Richard L. Hasen, H.R. 1 Can’t Pass the Senate. But Here Are Some Voting
Reforms That Could, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook
/2021/03/16/hr-1-voting-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/73B4-FX5Y].
414 Id.
415 See Letter from The Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts., Support H.R. 1, the For
the People Act (Mar. 1, 2019), https://civilrights.org/resource/support-h-r-1-the-for-thepeople-act/ [https://perma.cc/7T4L-UJ23].
416 See Max Feldman, 10 Voter Fraud Lies Debunked, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May
27, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/10-voter-fraud-liesdebunked [https://perma.cc/77KY-4CAC].
413
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Finally, I hope that we seek to elevate the voices of Black scholars and jurists,
along with others who are seeking to challenge white supremacy. The most
frequently cited or discussed jurist should be Thurgood Marshall. His many
dissents,417 which I have emphasized in this Article, should be studied closely so that
we can learn more about the history of white supremacy while also considering how
his dissenting opinions might be elevated to controlling authority. Taking a page
from Thurgood Marshall’s own work as a lawyer and jurist, students should also
learn that civil rights lawyers have often sought recourse in the courts not “out of a
philosophical belief regarding the optimal role for courts in a democracy”418 but
because, like Marshall, they considered the third branch to be their “last hope.”419
That recognition should help our students better understand how to be resistance
lawyers.
Much work needs to be done at the grassroots level to change our understanding
of what it means to live in an equitable society where Black lives matter. We cannot
expect the Supreme Court to take the lead in dismantling white supremacy, but the
Supreme Court should also not be left off the hook as irrelevant. Its jurisprudence
helps empower and further white supremacy. This Article has sought to tell that
story.

Others have written about his outstanding dissents. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch,
Celebrating Thurgood Marshall: The Prophetic Dissenter, 52 HOW. L.J. 617 (2009); Mark
Tushnet, The Principled Dissenter, 72 A.B.A. J. 29 (1986); William J. Daniels, Thurgood
Marshall and the Administration of Criminal Justice: An Analysis of Dissenting Opinions, 6
BLACK L.J. 43 (1978); John T. Hand, Thurgood Marshall’s Dissents in Defense of the Poor,
13 PACE L. REV. 305 (1993).
418 Rebecca Brown, Deep and Wide: Justice Marshall’s Contributions to Constitutional
Law, 52 HOW. L.J. 637, 637 (2009).
419 Id.
417

